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ABSTRACT 
THE CENTRALITY OF DISAGREEMENT 
 
SEPTEMBER 2014 
 
BRIAN T. CONNOR, B.A., TULANE UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Gianpaolo Baiocchi 
 
This dissertation brings the philosophical writings of Jacques Rancière to 
sociology through the examination of women’s suffrage in the US from the late 18th 
through mid 19th century. The issue of equality takes center stage here, as Rancière’s 
politics is based on the alteration of symbolic categories of equal and unequal. The result 
is a sociological theory of politics that claims disagreement, not consensus, must be at the 
base of any democratic politics that broadly seeks equality. Women’s limited suffrage in 
New Jersey from 1776-1807, and the build up and proclamation of equality at the Seneca 
Falls Convention in 1848 are the cases examined to show the necessity of disagreement 
for equality in democratic politics. 
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CHAPTER 1 
RANCIÈRE AND SOCIAL THEORY 
1.1 Introduction 
 The study of politics has been a staple of sociology. From the discipline’s 
theoretical forbearers to contemporary works in sub-disciplines as diverse as culture, 
organizations, and identities, politics has remained at the front of both sociological 
research and theory. Introducing a new theory of politics to an already large field of 
theories on the topic requires highlighting some new contribution or synthesis of ideas 
that can lead to a new understanding of politics at the empirical level.  
 The philosophy of Jacques Rancière is worthy of such incorporation into a 
sociological understanding of politics. His work is unique in two ways. First, it is a theory 
of politics as equality, yet not in a traditional Marxist sense of linking equality largely to 
anti-capitalist politics. Second, it is a generalist theory of politics, bringing together 
diverse strands of theories and epistemologies to create a theory that can apply to both 
macro and micro-analyses of politics. Rancière’s work finds many analogues across 
social and sociological theory. Combining insights from Marx, Durkheim, symbolic 
interactionism, and intersectionality, among others, Rancière’s philosophy takes up issues 
from numerous theoretical and epistemological traditions. The result is a theory that is 
centered on equality yet non-determinist; focused on both everyday moments of 
resistance and mass movements. The general versatility of a Rancière-inspired theory of 
politics for sociology gives it play in disciplinary subfields such as political sociology, 
social movement studies, cultural sociology, and other fields focused on identity and 
stratification. 
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 Jacques Rancière’s philosophy has yet to have much presence in US sociology, 
but has begun to take root in the US in fields such as literature (Rockhill 2004; Parker 
2009), cultural studies (Conley 2009; Ferris 2009), political science (Dean 2009; 
Tambakaki 2009; Schaap 2011), philosophy (Hallward 2006; May 2010; Ulary 2011), 
and education (Pelletier 2009a; Den Heyer 2009). The breadth of his disciplinary reach 
reflects the range of writings he has done over the course of his career, from histories to 
art criticism to traditional philosophy. A student of Althusser’s in the late 1960s, 
Rancière’s work is centered on questions of equality and democracy, but his break with 
Althusser places him outside a traditional Marxist theoretical position. His approach to 
discipline, power, and social reproduction at times draws comparisons to Foucault (May 
2010), and his optimism regarding ‘common people’ and the political capacities of the 
excluded put him in company with Paulo Freire and John Dewey (Liang 2009). The 
paradoxical qualities of his writings also bears resemblances to Gramsci, but the non-
material foundations of his theory, and at the same time his emphasis on equality make 
him distinct from all of them.   
 Because of his myriad writings, a selective reading of his works is necessary to 
focus on his theory of democracy. These four main works – Disagreement (1999); On the 
Shores of Politics (1995); Ten Theses on Politics (2001); and Hatred of Democracy 
(2006) – lay out a democratic theory based on radical assumptions of democratic society 
and our understanding of equality. Drawing largely on these works, I will expand and 
bridge the main theoretical points necessary for a sociological theory of politics. The 
assumptions and terms are: the distribution of parts in democracy (and its miscount); the 
community of equals; interruption; and the politics/police distinction at center of 
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Rancière’s theory of democracy. These four points (along with a few other minor ones) 
form the basis of a sociological theory of politics primarily concerned with radical 
equality. Where this chapter analyzes these concepts in relation to other popular social 
theorists, the following chapter will compare the concepts to sociological theories, 
creating a set of concepts better translated for sociology. 
 
1.2 Democracy as Equality 
 Equality is a central part of all democratic theories. In its simplest sense, 
democracy is a form of governance where all citizens have a say in the workings of the 
state. From representative democracy to deliberative or direct democracy, these models 
are premised on the assumption that all citizens are politically equal. This version of 
equality tends to be a limited version. In the public and political spheres, democratic 
theory in general requires equality among citizens. Non-public spheres are unrelated to 
this public equality, allowing the justification of various forms of inequalities in private 
spheres, so long as these do not (greatly) affect relations among citizens in the public 
sphere.  
 Rancière’s theory of politics is centered on a radical conception of democracy, 
one that posits absolute equality in all aspects of life. This treatment of democracy 
expands the boundaries of political systems beyond the realm of state and civil society, 
opening up myriad locations for where democracy exists. Democracy as equality is a 
mode of being that can manifest itself in any social location, between any social groups 
or actors.  
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 Linking democracy and equality to all human existence or social spheres has been 
a common theme in contemporary post-Marxist theories of democracy.1 Chantal Mouffe, 
Ernesto Laclau, Alain Badiou, and Jean-Luc Nancy all theorize about democracy and 
politics centered on its relation to equality in any human or social relationship. What sets 
Rancière apart from these other theorists, and why his work is more relevant to sociology, 
is: (1) his creation of a theory of politics that remains linked to the social as opposed to 
strictly the philosophical; (2) a critical understanding of democracy and equality that 
rejects any romanticism or notion that democracy can by itself create equality, or that 
equality is some state that can be achieved. 
 
1.3 Rancière’s Politics 
1.3.1 The Parts and Miscounts of Democratic Society 
Rancière starts Disagreement with a dialogue on the classics, drawing on Aristotle 
and Plato to find what the foundation of democratic politics might be. The ideal city for 
these philosophers was one where blaberon, or the harm or unpleasantness that can 
happen to someone, was eliminated, leaving only its supposed opposite, sumpheron 
(Rancière 1999: 3-4). This is a city where justice is not based on interpersonal harm, but 
on “…the way the forms of exercising and of controlling the exercising of this common 
capacity are divided up” (5). From this vantage point, justice means, “not taking more… 
or less than one’s share…” of advantageous or disadvantageous things (5).  
                                                
1 Theories of democracy have always centered on equality, but in many, if not most instances, that equality 
has only been granted to some of the population. From the slaves of Athens to the various restrictions of 
democratic politics throughout the history of the US, the practice of democracy has rarely, if ever, been 
centered on equality for all. 
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This conception of justice is flawed, Rancière argues, because in its attempt to 
create a simple mathematical harmony of the common and of parties in the city, it creates 
the wrong, or blaberon, it seeks to avoid.  
For the city to be ordered according to the good, community shares must be 
strictly in proportion to the axia of each part of the community: to the value it 
brings the community and to the right that this value bestows on it to hold a share 
of the common power (Rancière 1999: 6). 
 
The classics treat these values as representative of three groups: the wealth of the oligoï, 
the virtue of the aristoï, and the freedom of the demos. These parties, or parts, make up 
the (ancient) community, where each of these groups counter each other (“the oligarchy 
of the rich, the aristocracy of the good, or the democracy of the people” (6)), and produce 
the ideal, non-democratic society based in justice. The problem with this accounting of 
parts is that, at least for the demos, it is a false count. The freedom of the demos is merely 
the freedom from enslavement by the oligoï: it “was transformed into the appearance of a 
freedom that was to be the positive property of the people as part of the community” (7). 
In other words, the demos supposedly has freedom because it lacks the other values of the 
community, yet these other parts have freedom because their wealth and virtue provide 
them the ability to exercise their wills. The oligoï and aristoï, by virtue of possessing 
qualities the demos lacks, make up what Rancière calls the rich. The demos are the poor. 
 However, Rancière claims the demos provides themselves with one unique quality 
– equality with all other citizens (Rancière 1999: 8). Because freedom is the only thing 
that links rich and poor, it challenges the making of the city parts. There can be no 
construction of the just based entirely in sumpheron because the division of parts is a 
miscount. “The people [demos] are not one class among others. They are the class of the 
wrong that harms the community and establishes it as a ‘community’ of the just and 
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unjust” (9). The poor receive no real part compared to the rich. Having a part in this 
system is being the rich. This is the paradoxical founding of politics for Rancière: any 
foundation of the just is in fact based on injustice, or the miscounting of parts. 
 Rancière’s use of the terms rich and poor to describe those with and without parts 
can help clarify what a part is, especially when thinking about politics outside the civil 
sphere. As mentioned, a part represents some advantageous quality, value, or resource 
that a group of people possesses. Having a part puts one into the group of the rich. The 
poor lack this part: “[w]hoever has no part – the poor of ancient times, the third estate, 
the proletariat – cannot in fact have any part other than all or nothing” (Rancière 1999: 
9). Having a part in a certain sphere means having power in that sphere: the rights of a 
citizen in a democratic civil sphere; the possession of wealth and the means of production 
in the economic sphere; or self-determination in the domestic sphere. This power gives 
rise to equality among the rich. The poor, or those without part, create moments of 
politics through reconstructing the boundaries and relationships between the rich and 
poor. This reconstruction, Rancière warns, will then create a new grouping of rich and 
poor. In all social formations, there will be a miscount, and a part without part (Rancière 
1995: 84). 
 This continuous process of miscounts, interruptions, and new (mis)counts raises 
the question of who is doing this counting of parts?  This counting is part of the problem 
with the foundation of politics. Though Rancière does not directly address this question, 
the count is done by those who make up the community of equals in that sphere. 
Discussed in more detail below, the community of equals is a group that holds all rights 
and privileges that one could acquire in a particular sphere. This community maintains 
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their borders of included/excluded through police. A new count would only take place 
after a moment of politics, where some excluded subjectivity demands inclusion to this 
community of equals. The paradox of counting is that any new count only consists of the 
newly formed community of equals, again miscounting some other excluded subjectivity. 
Only those who are equal, or more specifically equal in terms of holding power in that 
sphere, can count.  
 
1.3.2 Community of Equals 
 Building up from a miscounted distribution of parts, Rancière sets up the 
distinction between those who are considered full members of society with an equal share 
of parts, and those excluded, or “the part with without a part.” The former is the 
community of equals, a grouping of subjects who are entitled to the rights and privileges 
the society has to offer. This group is contingent and shifting, yet always constructing 
itself as natural (Rancière 1995: 84). The community of equals is a symbolic, socially 
constructed, and malleable marker between those who have full equality and those who 
lack it to varying degrees. It’s opposite is the part without, or the excluded. In democratic 
society, this part without is often times hidden, or its existence is denied entirely 
(Rancière 1999: 14). The community of equals then is never fully inclusive, as it 
produces its own inequalities. 
 Hannah Arendt’s work on rights and the difference between human and citizen 
mirror some of Rancière’s concerns on surrounding the community of equals and those 
excluded from it. However, as Schaap (2011) forcefully argues, there is a sharp 
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difference between the two when analyzing the rights of the excluded compared to the 
included.  
 Arendt speaks of rights while analyzing the problem of statelessness. In her 
discussions, she sets up a dichotomy between the human, which represents mere life, and 
the citizen, representing the good life. Being a citizen means belonging to a community – 
a political one that allows for members to speak and be heard (Arendt 1958). For those 
who are stateless or not citizens,  
…they no longer belong to any community whatsoever. Their plight is not that 
they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are 
oppressed but that nobody wants even to oppress them (Arendt 1968: 295-6). 
 
The non-existence, or at least undesirability, of the stateless matches Rancière’s “part 
without a part” fairly well. Both confront exclusion to a larger community that denies or 
hides their existence. However, Arendt takes the difference between those with rights and 
the rightless to a level that creates an ontological gap between herself and Rancière. 
 The rightless for Arendt are denied more than equality, or access to a community 
of equals. They are denied human rights, or lack the right to have rights (Arendt 1968: 
296). The lack of access to the political community leaves the stateless without human 
rights, “…the loss of the relevance of speech… and the loss of all human relationship… 
the loss, in other words, of some of the most essential characteristics of human life” 
(Arendt 1968: 297). This linking of human rights as the rights of the citizen is 
problematic, Rancière claims, as it places human rights in a paradox: they are either the 
rights of the citizen or nothing, the rights of the poor and excluded (Rancière 2010b: 67). 
In other words, just like the problem of the miscount discussed earlier, the stateless either 
lack human rights, or it is a false right that results in it becoming meaningless. Schaap 
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(2011) notes that in Rancière’s politics, the subject as citizen or stateless is not the 
defining marker of rights (or equality). “The subject that claims its human rights emerges 
in the interval between the identities of citizen and human…” (Schaap 2011: 34). There is 
no room for the rightless in Arendt’s political community; Rancière’s politics as an 
enactment of equality allows subjects to move from excluded to included, from rightless 
to citizen. Rancière's politics affords the excluded both rights and the ability to express 
them against the lack of inclusion to the community of equals (34). The ontological 
difference between Rancière and Arendt on rights and politics leads to competing 
characterizations of subjects and their relation to the community of equals. Arendt creates 
a static division between citizen and the rightless that leaves little room for the excluded 
to actively achieve equality. Rancière’s focus on the expressive and performative aspects 
of politics allows for subjects to recognize their unequal state without giving up any 
semblance of human rights. 
 Agamben draws on Arendt’s ideas of rights and incorporates a Foucaultian 
analysis of biopower to create a contemporized theory of rightlessness. Like Arendt, 
Agamben sets up a distinction between zoe and bios, mere life and political life 
(Agamben 1998:1). Instead of staying with Arendt’s distinction between those who have 
rights and those who do not, Agamben draws on Foucault to show how modern states use 
biopolitical practices to erode the distinction between zoe and bios. The result is the 
creation of bare life, a state of existence between inclusion and exclusion, between 
oppression and freedom (38). Agamben’s theory is one that deconstructs the community 
of equals, as his argument is centered on the trend in governance from freedom to 
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surveillance (174-76). Those with and without a part in this theory are being lumped into 
one category – perhaps as equals but all as equals in a system of biopower.  
 The same critique that Rancière levels against Arendt can also be applied to 
Agamben. Though Agamben attempts to show a new grouping of individuals between the 
realms of rights and rightlessness, this positioning of subjects in a state of exception still 
is one that precludes these subjectivities from acting with regard to the political 
community. Biopower, Rancière argues, is tied entirely to Agamben’s conception of 
politics, creating a depoliticizing trap where “…politics gets equated with power and 
power itself gets increasingly construed as an overwhelming historico-ontological destiny 
from which only a God can save us” (Rancière 2010b: 67). Once again, the subject is 
ontologically defined in a way that seemingly precludes the subject living in a state of 
exception to act politically so to enter a community of equals. For Rancière communities 
of equals can never be understood as static entities where the excluded are incapable of 
acting on their own to gain equality. 
  
1.3.3 Politics 
 Politics for Rancière is ineluctably tied to police. These concepts form the content 
of what we normally consider all political action to fall under. Rancière, however, 
considerably narrows the definition of what politics can be. To say it briefly, politics is 
the struggle over the distribution of parts and membership in the community of equals.   
Whether this [excluded] part exists is the political issue and it is the object of 
political litigation. Political struggle is not a conflict between well defined interest 
groups; it is an opposition of logics that count the parties and parts of the 
community in different ways (Rancière 2001: 6:19). 
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Rancière’s unique definition of politics shows that the foundational aspect of politics is 
inclusion. Subjectivities are struggling not over resources but logics – ones that recognize 
the excluded as deserving membership to the community of equals versus others that do 
not. Challenging the exclusion from the community of equals addresses a fundamental 
wrong that transcends typical conflicts, as it represents a “radical otherness” between 
parts of the society (Rancière 1995: 97). Politics is an attempt to address, and ultimately 
solve, the problem of otherness so that the excluded no longer represent that radical 
outsider. This changes the nature of politics compared to traditional political theory. 
Material interests and pre-existing subjectivities (such as class-based ones), both popular 
explanations for how politics emerge, are rejected. Replacing these is a theory of politics 
that is not based in pre-existing subjects but in the relationship of ruling and being ruled, 
“which is not a relationship between subjects, but one between two contradictory terms 
through which a subject is defined” (Rancière 2001: 1:4).  Politics attempts to uncover 
this other definition of the subject, one that posits no one person or group can hold 
mastery over another. 
 The interruption of a political moment is more than the performance of politics. It 
is the dissensus that is the essence of politics (Rancière 2001 8:24). Rancière draws on a 
metaphor of two worlds – one is the police order, or “natural” order with its partition of 
parts and the divisible, and the second is the world of the new subjectivity or demand. 
“Politics makes visible that which had no reason to be seen, it lodges one world into 
another…” (Rancière 2001: 8:24). In other words, politics is an interruption into the 
realm of what exists in its divisions and parts with the demand for equality. Politics as 
interruption makes the form of politics contingent and ephemeral. Contingent in that 
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there is no predetermined subject or place of politics, and ephemeral in that it is present 
only when there are subjects demanding equality: 
A political subject is not a group of interests or ideas: It is the operator of a 
particular mode of subjectification and litigation through which politics has its 
existence. Political demonstrations are thus always of the moment and their 
subjects are always provisional. Political difference is always on the shore of its 
own disappearance… (Rancière 2001: 8:25). 
 
If we are concerned with a politics of radical equality, then disagreement (in the form of 
interruption) becomes the key component of a democratic politics of equality. 
Jean-Luc Nancy and Alain Badiou both center their own versions of politics on 
the question of equality. Nancy’s conception of democracy and politics is taken as a spirit 
before a form (Nancy 2010: 14-15). Rather than speak about democracy in terms of 
social equality, Nancy uses commonality as the base of democracy, which is a will 
“…where what is expressed and recognized is a true possibility of being all together, all 
and each one among all” (Nancy 2010: 14). Politics in this form of democracy is 
recognizing the incommensurability between individuals. There is no liberal, 
individualized equivalence among actors. It is the nonequivalent affirmation of equality 
that forms the base and space for politics (24-5). Democracy, in fact, makes the political 
possible (Brault and Naas 2010: xi). Where Rancière’s politics shares this affirmation of 
equality as the basis of politics, Nancy’s treatment of democracy as a spirit leaves his 
politics as a psychological-philosophical.  
 Rancière’s limited but radical definition of politics is also similar to Alain 
Badiou’s. In fact, Badiou “sees himself” in many of Rancière’s concepts (Badiou 2005: 
116). Both Badiou and Rancière offer theories of politics and the political that are based 
in the idea of politics as an opening that can bring about equality. What sets Rancière 
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apart, and what makes his work a better fit for the social sciences, is his rooting of 
politics in history as opposed to Badiou’s non-temporal treatment of political moments 
(116-7). 
 Badiou treats politics as a matter of truths – the implementation and 
deconstruction of truths, and the process of creating and challenging these truths. This 
“truth procedure” becomes politics through the complex relationship between the 
multiplicity and infinity of human existence meeting the particular and singular moments 
of (political) events that challenge the “state of the situation,” the presented composition 
of the collective (Badiou 2005: 141-4). Politics interrupts this “state” by rejecting the 
closed boundaries and particular truths that this state presents as being universal. Politics 
as emancipation opens up what Badiou calls the “infinity of the situation,” the open 
ontology of human relations (142-3). “The infinite comes into play in every truth 
procedure, but only in politics does it take first place. This is because only in politics is 
deliberation about the possible (and hence about the infinity of the situation) constitutive 
of the process itself” (143).  
 Both Badiou and Rancière focus on the emancipatory potential of politics. Their 
theories both treat politics as a process meant to deconstruct and overturn a set of 
relationships between subjects or truths. Badiou claims one difference between himself 
and Rancière is how the two of them root politics in universalities and historical 
contexts.2 For both theorists, politics is taken as a singular moment of a “mode of 
                                                
2 Badiou criticizes Rancière on a number of fronts in Metapolitics. One in particular worth mentioning is 
Badiou’s claim that Rancière ignores the militancy of a political moment, instead viewing politics as  
“…phantom masses against an unnamed State. But the real situation demands instead that we pit a few rare 
political militants against the ‘democratic’ hegemony of the parliamentary State…” (Badiou 2005: 121-2). 
These interruptions, in other words, do not originate as mass movements. They are radical demands coming 
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subjectification” (Badiou 2005: 116). The difference lies in their conception of political 
moments as singularities: 
…Rancière’s understanding of singularity, as pure historical occurrence, …must 
be ‘carried’ as it were by the unequal of the State, or in other words by history. 
This is not the case with my thought of politics as truth process, for singularity is 
determined in its being (this is generic reality) and has no relation as such to 
historical time, for it constitutes its own time through and through (Badiou 2005: 
117). 
 
Badiou’s politics is one that is universal and non-temporal. It is a general interruption that 
is not bounded to specific historical contexts. Rancière’s politics, however, is one that is 
completely tied to the historical contingencies surrounding the event. Because politics is 
an ephemeral moment, it remains tied to the conditions that allowed the possibility of the 
moment to occur. While Badiou’s critique of Rancière may be an important philosophical 
one, for the social sciences it is in fact a positive trait of Rancière’s politics. To make use 
of his theory in the social sciences, some connection must be made between the political 
(as opposed to the philosophical) and the social. Badiou seeks to erase this connection.  
 
1.3.4 Police  
Police is generally what happens when questions of equality and parts are absent 
from what we usually consider to be political actions. Rancière first characterizes police 
in Disagreement as “the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of 
collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, 
and the systems for legitimizing this distribution” (Rancière 1999: 28). In Ten Theses, 
Rancière focuses on the symbolic form of police as the “partition of the sensible,”  
                                                                                                                                            
from counter-hegemonic discourses, and must be built up and strengthened to become some form of 
enacted change. 
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…characterized by the absence of a void or a supplement: society consists of 
groups dedicated to specific modes of action, in places where these occupations 
are exercised, in modes of being corresponding to these occupations and these 
places. In this fittingness of functions, places, and ways of being, there is no place 
for a void.  It is this exclusion of what “there is not” that is the police-principle at 
the heart of statist practices (Rancière 2001: 7:21).  
 
Police both “allows participation” and “separates and excludes,” yet it is “neither 
repression nor even control over the living” (Rancière 2001: 7:20). This challenging 
conceptualization of police can make its application to sociology appear daunting. 
However, it is best applied by thinking what is at stake in the action – does it demand an 
entirely new configuration of relations between subjectivities or do they remain given? 
Rancière writes, “[a] strike is not political when it calls for reforms rather than a better 
deal or when it attacks the relationships of authority rather than the inadequacy of wages.  
It is political when it reconfigures the relationships that determine the workplace in its 
relation to the community” (Rancière 1999: 32). Looking at the “there is not” or the void 
is exposing the contradictory logics over parts and doing politics. This disrupts a 
“natural” order, or the community with its naturalized division of parts and roles 
(Rancière 2001: 6:19). The absence of this disruption is police. 
To better understand police, it can be helpful to see it as two interrelated parts: the 
boundaries of the natural order and the management of that order. “[Police] structures 
perceptual space in terms of places, functions, aptitudes, etc., to the exclusion of any 
supplement” (Rancière 2010c: 92). In this sense, police attempts to create a total social 
order where all groups and parts are accounted for. However, this order is based on a 
false count, so a “supplement” exists that makes itself known through politics. This 
understanding of police and the natural order has parallels between it and hegemony 
studies based in the works of Gramsci, where hegemonic orders allow or ignore various 
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identities, cultures, or actions depending on their fit in capitalist society (Hall et al. 1978; 
Willis 1977). Discussed in more detail in chapter four, the natural order is the result of 
successful police practices. A stable natural order is one where certain inequalities are 
justified, naturalized, or ignored and invisible. Politics, because it deconstructs the 
relationship between subjectivities, also deconstructs a given natural order. 
The second understanding of police is akin to governmentality studies, where 
social order is maintained but done so without fundamental shifts in the distribution of 
parts (Ong 2003, 2006; Miller and Rose 2008; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Brown 2006). 
Police is not a force such as a police officer or other coercive officer of the state. It is a 
logic that is part of the everyday functioning of society: in symbolic and material aspects 
of life, in coercive force and consensual action. Police links the divisions of parts in 
society with the management and governance of subjects in that society.  
Foucault’s work on governmentality and biopower are the closest analogue to this 
understanding of police. In fact, both police and governmentality have a similar 
genealogy and concern for the “health of the state” (May 2008: 41). Foucault’s lectures 
on political governmentality (Foucault 2007) and neoclassical governmentality (Foucault 
2008) both show the operations systems of governance for political and economic 
subjects, or the structuring of “perceptual space” of police. Baiocchi and Connor (2013) 
analyze the similarities and differences between police and governmentality, arguing that 
while the two concepts are similar, Rancière’s rests in a larger theory of politics that 
differentiates politics geared towards enacting equality versus politics that is rooted in the 
technocratic management of the self and state.  
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Rancière argues that he and Foucault have different ontological standpoints from 
which to address politics. Foucault’s politics is reduced to biopower and biopolitics, “an 
ontology of individuation” rather than something where the subject and community 
intersect (Rancière 2010c: 94, 93). Politics is reduced to (bio)power, leaving no room for 
the supplement. A total social system is created in Foucault’s biopower that depoliticizes 
because it ignores the miscounted part. Like Arendt and Agamben, Foucault leaves no 
room for the excluded and their ability to demand inclusion to a community of equals. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
Rancière’s theory of politics, as outlined above, is a unique take on politics as 
equality. It is the demand for equality from a “part without a part’ or “supplement” to the 
natural order that is the essence of politics. Rancière celebrates the abilities of these 
excluded subjectivities to enact politics, setting his theories apart from the depoliticizing 
tendencies of Arendt, Agamben, and Foucault. Where these theories set up totalizing 
theories of inclusion/exclusion or control, Rancière’s politics allows room for the 
excluded to act on their own behalf. At the same time, his theory of politics remains 
connected to temporal contingencies, creating a theory better suited for the social 
sciences compared to the more abstract philosophies of Badiou and Nancy.  
To create a sociological theory of politics based in Rancière’s work, however, 
some of these concepts need tailoring to fit a sociological framework. The following 
chapter will reconstruct a sociological version of Rancière’s theory, looking at how this 
theory of politics has many similarities, yet remains distinct, from major sociological 
theories.
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CHAPTER 2 
RECONSTRUCTING RANCIÈRE: THE POLITICS OF EQUALS 
2.1 Introduction 
 Rancière’s political philosophy, as discussed in the previous chapter, is a unique 
symbolic take on politics, democracy, and equality. Treating politics in a narrow but 
radical sense as the interruption of regimes of governance with the demand for equality, 
Rancière challenges traditional sociological assumptions of what politics is and where a 
political moment comes from. Rather than ignore this challenge as something 
incommensurable with sociology, his political philosophy has the potential to enliven 
sociological debates on topics like resistance, equality, and civil society.  
To bring Rancière’s philosophy into dialogue with the social sciences means 
providing more concrete definitions to relevant sociological concepts. This process of 
translation makes Rancière more accessible to social science, but runs the risk of limiting 
or expanding the meanings of key concepts and ideas. The result is a sociological theory 
of politics that is, if not Rancièrean, at least Rancière-inspired. Philosophy taken in its 
abstract sense makes for a difficult translation to the social sciences. Rancière’s 
philosophy must undergo considerable reconstruction to be useful for sociology, and the 
process of translation leads to the unpacking of philosophical “black boxes” that 
philosophers take for granted (Latour 1987). These black boxes are concepts and ideas 
that are taken as vague givens, and lack detailed description or analysis. For philosophy, 
concepts like society, the state, and institutions make up black boxes of the discipline. 
They remain vague givens because they generally fall outside the purview of philosophy, 
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and extended discussions and definitions of them provide little benefit for many 
philosophical works. Building a sociological theory based on these philosophical black 
boxes in effect creates a new theory – one that is largely based in Rancière, but 
incorporating various sociological insights and concepts when necessary. 
This chapter turns Rancière’s political philosophy into a sociological theory of 
politics – the Politics of Equality. The Politics of Equality is based on a sociological 
reconstruction of a number of Rancière’s concepts – equality, community of equals, 
police, and politics. Re-imagining these concepts for sociology highlights a particular 
paradox of democratic politics where the institutionalization of emancipatory moments 
creates new forms of inequality. It is largely a symbolic theory, based in the challenge of 
an unequal distribution of “parts,” or places in a community of equals. It is also 
decentered, meaning that politics can occur in any sphere – public or private – and though 
these spheres may be connected, equality must be fought for in each sphere. Equality is 
an ongoing project with constantly shifting borders in each sphere. Myriad fields of 
politics are constantly in flux, with actors pushing for more or less equality for particular 
subjectivities. The Politics of Equality is a theoretical lens that seeks to uncover and 
explain how this struggle over equality emerges and can bring about concrete changes in 
the status of subjectivities in society. 
   
2.2 Equality 
 The concept of equality is simple in its abstract form, but increases in complexity 
when used closer to the empirical world. Equality for Rancière is based on two 
interrelated ideas. First, equality means no person holds mastery over another (Rancière 
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1991). In The Ignorant Schoolmaster, Rancière argues that in an equal relationship the 
teacher does not transmit knowledge but instead provides the tools for the student to 
utilize in order for her to gain that knowledge. When a teacher lectures, only selected 
parts of that knowledge are transmitted; the teacher withholds certain information and 
retains mastery of the subject over the student. The illiterate father, Rancière argues, can 
teach his son how to read, negating the need for the “expert” teacher. The student has the 
possibility and ability to learn as much as the expert, without that person confining what 
is or is not relevant or useful for attaining that knowledge. While certainly controversial, 
this take on expertise and mastery is meant to apply to any and all social constructions of 
mastery and expertise over others. To be equal means rejecting and fighting relationships 
where the expert or a position of power allows for domination and control over others. 
 Second, Rancière’s equality also means everyone holds the same rights and 
privileges as any other. As discussed in Chapter One, democratic societies naturally 
produce inequalities, where certain subjectivities are placed in unequal standing, or even 
outright excluded from being considered part of the community. Equality that entails 
sharing all rights and privileges means parsing down the specific sphere or community of 
equals in question, and understanding what this absolute equality would look like in that 
community.  
 Finally, Rancièrean equality focuses less on some version of absolute equality as 
an end state, and instead examines equality as a process that drives politics. Politics, 
simply put, is a subjectivity that is enacting or verifying the actual equality between all 
(Rancière 1991: 138). Inequality is also treated as a process, or something that emerges 
from the police order (governmental politics) and naturalizes supposed differences 
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between subjectivities. Treating equality as a process helps sociologists from taking a 
utopian or romantic stance on fighting inequality that posits real equality will arise with 
some specific challenge to the political, economic, or some other sphere. Inequalities will 
always exist and be justified or ignored, and focusing on equality as process is meant to 
keep sociology focused on excluded subjectivities and their “unintelligible” discourse, 
forgotten issues, or even reactionary claims against equality for some.  
 
2.2.1 The Problem of Equality in Sociology 
 This conceptualization places equality at the starting point of any analysis of the 
social world. For Rancière, the problem with sociology is that the discipline starts with 
the opposite – inequality – and only seeks to reaffirm or recreate that inequality. Pelletier 
(2009a; 2009b) argues that Rancière’s critique of social science finds two problems: the 
scientist and the social.  
 The scientist, even one attempting to fight inequalities, tends to reproduce 
inequalities through their production of “expert” knowledge (Pelletier 2009a). Analyzing 
Rancière’s critique on Bourdieu and education, Pelletier claims, 
From this perspective, Bourdieu’s analysis of the division of knowledge between 
social groups appears as an explanation of inequality: the poor do not succeed 
academically because they cannot formulate scholarly discourse, as a consequence 
of their habitus. Rancière’s counter to this is that the poor do not succeed 
academically because their discourse is not treated or ‘heard’ as scholarly – and 
that this is precisely what Bourdieu’s sociology also does (Pelletier 2009a: 10 
emphasis in original). 
 
Equality, or the verification of it, should be the starting point of social analysis (Pelletier 
2009b). Assuming the poor “cannot formulate… discourse,” in any sphere or field leads 
to a reconstruction of inequality where the sociologist-as-expert does not recognize the 
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discourse of an Other as befitting that sphere. The reflexive sociologist, Rancière argues, 
is only reflexive regarding their position as expert in scientific discourse. They remain 
unreflexive of their role as creator of inequality by virtue of claiming their science gives 
them expertise and knowledge that is more valid than non-scientific discourse (Pelletier 
2009b).  
  Social science is also problematic because of the depoliticizing action of much 
research that roots actions to social locations and groups, cementing these categories 
(Pelletier 2009b). This second problem stems from tendencies in social science to treat 
identity categories and social locations in a fixed manner. Though most social scientists 
would recognize the complexity of identities, categories, and social locations, much 
research brackets that complexity in favor of a generalized black box or ideal type. In 
doing so, social science oriented towards equality at best achieves partial success. The 
fixity of categories may benefit some, but it leaves some Other as a poor fit for the 
category or location completely outside of the ideal type. Pelletier writes,  
Rancière’s point is to show the way in which critiques of domination based on 
presumed ‘dominated’ identities pre-empt the very possibility for equality that 
such critiques are supposed to open up. In other words, the presumption of a pre-
constituted… identity works to reinforce inequality rather than the other way 
round (Pelletier 2009a: 10). 
 
What Pelletier (and Rancière) call for is not entirely new. Feminist theory, and the work 
of Judith Butler (1990; 1997) in particular, has shown the limitations of taking broad 
identity categories and the exclusion and even oppression that comes from this system of 
generalization. However, taken with Rancière’s critique of the social scientist as expert, 
the two critiques point to the stratifying tendencies of social science research.  
 One solution for social science – in both the problems of the social and the 
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scientist - is based in performativity and the struggle against static conceptions of 
identity. “[E]quality is made perceivable or imaginable, by representing it as a kind of 
doing, in and through which political subjects are constituted” (Pelletier 2009a: 10). It 
means distancing studies from the social because society itself is ordering, and therefore 
hierarchical (Pelletier 2009b). Social science research should turn away from looking at 
specific categories and identities and their hierarchical placement in a sphere, and instead 
focus on the processes that lead to distinctions between “…intelligible and unintelligible, 
essential and inessential, theoretical and practical…” (Pelletier 2009a: 13-14). 
Sociological research then confronts (in)equality through analyzing discursive formations 
and actions that either uphold or challenge a natural order. 
 The limits of this approach is that the study of equality becomes limited to either 
descriptions of ephemeral, individualized moments of politics or Foucaultian genealogies 
of repressive discourses that separate discourse from noise. The morphology of politics 
from moment to movement to institutionalization is ignored, as singular political 
demands provide equality for some and deny it to others. This is the paradox of politics 
for sociology. Any and all political moments that move beyond individualized 
performances narrow the scope of discourse and intelligibility. Rather than ignoring the 
larger process of politics as a whole, the Politics of Equals must build off performatives 
of equality and explain and theorize how these moments succeed and fail, and show the 
subjectivities who remain relevant to the political moment and those who are ignored or 
excluded. Tracing the “verification of equality” from localized moments to potential 
institutionalization provides sociology a way to recognize and move beyond the paradox 
of politics.  
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2.2.2 The Communities of Equals 
The community of equals, as defined in the previous chapter, is a symbolic, 
malleable grouping of those who have the full rights and privileges of a particular 
community or sphere. Rancière labels those outside the community of equals as “the part 
without a part,” and claims their existence is usually ignored, hidden or denied (Rancière 
1999: 14). While this has certainly been true for some subjectivities, others hold tiered 
membership in a community of equals. Some rights may be conferred, but others denied. 
Sociological theorists have written extensively on both communities/spheres, and degrees 
of inequality in and among spheres. These works all point to a commonality between 
Rancière’s philosophical community of equals and sociological conceptions of spheres, 
fields, identities, and inequality.  
Where Rancière treats membership in a community of equals as an all or nothing 
proposition, sociological works show that this is rarely the case. The works of Simmel, 
Bourdieu, and Alexander all show that the relationship of equal/unequal is the result of 
individualized action in group formation (Simmel 1955a), interactions between capitals 
and habitus (Bourdieu 1984), and structuring codes that delineate roles and parts in a 
sphere (Alexander 2006). However, a Rancièrean community of equals remains unique 
through its treatment of equality, and treating the “poor”3 as being denied the ability to be 
properly heard, instead of unable to achieve or succeed in a community (Pelletier 2009b). 
Where, for example, a Bourdieusian field or Durkheimian solidarity sphere describe the 
situations of actors within the sphere, Rancièrean communities show the false distinctions 
                                                
3 “Poor” being a generalized marker Rancière uses as marker for the excluded and forgotten subjectivities 
in a community of equals. See Rancière (2004). 
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and dichotomies that deny the excluded and forgotten the ability to be heard in the same 
manner as the included.  
At the level of individualized interaction, the Politics of Equals challenges 
conceptions of “understanding” between subjects interacting in a particular sphere. A 
community of equals puts forward particularized sets of social relationships and 
meanings between people. Some hierarchies are open and public, others hidden or 
obfuscated. These specific relations emerge through processes of conflict and cooperation 
that set boundaries of groups and relations between individuals. Conflict, Simmel argues, 
is a necessary component of society because it helps define boundaries between an “us” 
and “them,” and is “…designed to resolve dualisms; it is a way of achieving some kind of 
unity, even if it be through annihilation of one of the conflicting parties” (Simmel 1955a: 
13). If inter-group conflict produces some degree of hierarchy in society, then 
competition brings about intra-group hierarchies. A group has leaders and followers, and 
people of various statuses in the group (Simmel 1955b: 152-3). However, these groups 
and hierarchies merely reinforce the natural order of the community of equals. 
Understanding in this community comes from communicating via accepted discourses 
that place specific subjectivities into specific roles. Unequal subjectivities are not heard 
in terms of their own discourse, they are only heard when communicating through the 
hegemonic discourse of the community of equals. In this sense, understanding is not 
merely successful communication, it is communication that deconstructs the relationships 
between subjects in a community. 
Bourdieusian sociologists and field theorists would reject the simple 
equal/unequal divide of Rancière’s community of equals, arguing that fields are more 
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broadly structured and represent hierarchies based in various intersecting forms of 
economic, cultural, and social capitals (Bourdieu 1984; Martin 2003; Fligstein and 
McAdam 2012). Bourdieu’s Distinction (1984) is perhaps the most detailed account of a 
field, mapping the relationship between economic and cultural capitals and tastes in 
various cultural products. This work, and the numerous others inspired by it (Peterson 
and Kern 1996; Bryson 1996; Hennion 2001; Johnston and Baumann 2007) argue that 
elites in various fields have specific tastes that separate them from people of lower 
classes. The conclusion of this and other Bourdieusian works, at least from a Rancièrean 
perspective, is that those who are poor or lacking in capitals are perceived to be incapable 
of understanding or appreciating certain cultural products (Pelletier 2009b: 14). The poor 
are not allowed a public voice to appreciate these things (such as classical music) in their 
own discourse. Appreciation of “elite” cultural products can only be understood with elite 
discourse.  
The community of equals is not structured like a field in the sense that a topic like 
taste is not based in a singular discourse. A community of equals (in its most ideal-typical 
sense) allows for differing discourses to be taken at the same face value. There is no 
singular way in which to appreciate or understand a cultural product. Rather, any and all 
interpretations must be understood in their own terms, separated from the symbolic 
power of those expressing judgment on that object. Applying this to communities and 
fields that are seen as more politicized than aesthetics means understanding the discourse 
of others as they do, not from our own preconceived definitions of politics, identity, or 
equality.  
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The issue of being heard, or being intelligible as an excluded or unequal member 
in a community brings the community of equals into dialogue with Durkheimian studies 
on solidarity spheres and civil repair. Alexander (2006) persuasively theorizes on the 
relationship between sacred codes and the relationship of actors in the democratic civil 
sphere. This sphere, as opposed to others, is structured by codes of equality for all 
citizens. Equality in the democratic civil sphere is both a guiding principle and a state of 
being that is constantly coming closer to being fully enacted (9). The relationship 
between the democratic civil sphere and other non-civil spheres such as the economic, 
religious, or domestic spheres is a contested one where solidarity replaces equality as the 
guiding principle. Hierarchy and inequality can exist in non-civil spheres, so long as 
these relationships are not terribly exploitative or affect relations in the civil sphere (266, 
241).  
The Politics of Equals sociology recognizes the importance of sacred codes in 
various spheres that help structure communities of equals. However, a Rancièrean 
perspective, concerned with equality above all else, challenges the valuation of solidarity 
above equality. A sphere with high solidarity may in fact merely be one in which 
excluded subjectivities either accept their position or are unable to be heard properly. The 
Politics of Equals turns the solidarity-equality relationship on its head: only the constant 
enacting of equality by all, in any community, produces solidarity. It is through verifying 
equality and understanding the discourse of all subjectivities that any solidarity can be 
produced.  
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2.3 Politics 
 From studies on mobilization and consensus building (Polletta 2006; Snow and 
Benford 1992; Lichterman 1996, 2005; Auyero 2001; Jacobs 2000) to strategies of action 
(Wood 2002; Fantasia 1989) and even inaction (Eliasoph 1998), great attention has been 
paid to the processes and actions of an organized movement in regards to social change.  
Yet when much of this literature discusses outcomes, gains and losses are largely taken at 
face value.  A wage increase is treated the same as collectivizing a factory.  Rancière 
challenges us to look beyond simple results to see what they mean in terms of equality in 
a particular community of equals. The politics of equality centers on symbolic markers of 
equality that alter the material composition of roles and parts in that community of 
equals. Disagreement over the rights and roles of subjectivities must be paramount 
concern in the Politics of Equals, not the resources various groups may or may not 
receive.   
 Other types of political action fall into what Rancière calls police. Though lacking 
the radical demand for equality, many forms of police are in fact quite beneficial to 
society as a whole, from environmental movements to improving the quality of life of the 
working poor. Rather than dismiss these political actions from being considered politics, 
it is better to label them as a separate form of politics. Baiocchi and Connor (2013) call 
police governmental politics, noting the similarities between Rancière’s police and 
Foucault’s governmentality. Both concepts focus on the governing and managing 
subjects under a stable system of parts and roles. Resistance to governmental regimes 
typically centers over issues of resources and their distribution, not symbolic questions of 
who holds rights and privileges in that community of equals (Baiocchi and Connor 2013: 
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97). This distinction between the Politics of Equals and governmental politics is a 
reminder that not all forms of progressive politics do the same thing – some are 
concerned with bettering the material conditions of unequal groups, where others are 
concerned with being accepted as fully equal members in a community of equals. 
Understanding this difference allows us to see trajectories and potential long-term effects 
that a movement has on society.  
 Rancière treats politics as a theatrical interruption where the excluded perform or 
enact politics (Hallward 2006). An interruption is a break in the logic of dispositions and 
parts in a society (Rancière 2001). The break, he argues, is a radical one because it 
deconstructs the relationships between subjectivities and more importantly the logic of 
exclusion (Rancière 1999: 39). The interruption, or moment of politics, needs further 
elucidation for sociological studies of politics. The theatrical or performative aspects of 
politics must be examined to uncover a bridge between the everyday politics of 
performativity, the large movement-based politics of performance studies, and the 
institutionalization of the claims of successful social movements. Further theoretical 
extension is needed to see both how the Politics of Equals arises, and what happens 
between that movement and some institutionalized change. Rancière leaves both, and 
particularly the latter, under-theorized. Sociological studies of politics already do much 
of this work, providing heuristics and methodologies of understanding what happens 
before and after a political interruption. 
 Sociological translations of Rancière also question the nature of the interruption, 
specifically its radical nature. Neo-Durkheimian research has provided the strongest case 
that the politics of equality may not always be as radical as advertised. In many instances 
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of politics in the US, they find that previously existing cultural codes are merely re-
applied onto an excluded subjectivity. Finally, the politics of equality must look beyond 
celebrations of increased equality in society and examine the opposite: attempts to reduce 
spheres of equality in various communities of equals. Myriad political parties and 
movements seek to reduce the rights and privileges of subjectivities in various spheres, be 
they undocumented migrants, racial and ethnic minorities, or members of the LGBT 
community.  
 
2.3.1 Politics, Performatives and Performance 
 As previously discussed, Rancièrean politics is best described as the enactment of 
equality. In this sense, politics is performative, as it is a discourse that produces both 
specific logics (of a subjectivity as an equal) and real effects in society where others must 
address this political enactment (Wedeen 2008: 15). At its core, the Politics of Equals is 
an individualized action meant to both deconstruct previous constructions of subjects and 
discourse and replace it with a new one that includes this subjectivity.  
 Like other performative theories (Butler 1990; Austin 1975; Derrida 1988), 
Rancièrean politics has been best understood through analyzing specific acts of politics 
(Rancière 2012 [1989]; May 2010; Chambers 2009) or from highlighting structures that 
construct and maintain dichotomies between expert and layperson, intelligible and 
unintelligible discourse, and equal or unequal in a sphere (Pelletier 2009a; Den Heyer 
2009). Rancièrean politics has deliberately been unconcerned or vague about the 
relationship between these moments of politics and institutional change. This is largely 
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due to the paradox of democratic politics mentioned above, where any movement 
towards institutionalized change leads to larger amounts of depoliticization. 
 Sociologists must live with this paradox, and instead of rejecting social science as 
part of the problem of depoliticization (Rancière 2004, 2001; Pelletier 2009b), the 
discipline should examine both how performatives move from individualized action to 
collective action, and how members in collective movements navigate this paradox. 
Performance theory (as opposed to performative theories) provides a conceptual bridge 
that can link individualized resistance to collective social action. Alexander (2004) and 
others (Reed 2006; Giesen 2006; Eyerman 2006) have shown how public performances 
are attempts to place a particular group’s claim as just. The social group in question, 
Alexander argues, must be perceived as fitting the role denied to them, such as equal 
member in the democratic civil sphere. By drawing on sacred codes of that sphere, 
actors’ demands are performances that link their unjust position to an understanding of 
what it should be. Connecting performance to performative in no way solves the 
democratic paradox. However, it does open up a heuristic from which to understand how 
demands for equality become institutionalized, and how these performances recreate 
some other form of inequality.  
 If politics is based in a performative enactment of equality, and institutionalized 
through the performance drawing on existing cultural codes, how radical is the Politics of 
Equals? As Alexander argues, the civil sphere as a relatively autonomous sphere can 
produce civil repair in non-civil spheres. Assuming that actors are relatively equal in the 
civil sphere, their ability to use that space as equals can translate into addressing and even 
eliminating inequalities in other spheres (Alexander 2006: 266-8). This formulation of 
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democratic politics provides an alternative reading to Rancière’s politics as a radical 
reconstruction of relations between included and excluded subjectivities. In the examples 
of Civil Rights or Women’s Rights in the US, the same structuring democratic codes are 
merely adjusted to include new identities. If there is radical change in the neo-
Durkheimian perspective, it comes from those in a community of equals recognizing the 
sameness and equality of the excluded subjectivity. For Rancièrean politics to bring about 
some form of institutionalized equality, it must resonate with the symbolic codes of that 
particular sphere. 
 However, this model of civil repair does not operate similarly at the 
individualized level of the performative. Politics itself is the enactment of equality, which 
entails that others understand this enactment as a unique discourse (instead of noise or 
something unintelligible) (Rancière 2001). This unique form of discourse cannot already 
exist in the natural order – the one doing politics has been silenced or misunderstood until 
this point. It is the process of moving from atomized moments of politics to a political 
movement where this new discourse of equality must dialogue with existing codes of that 
particular sphere. The navigation of new and existing discourses through collective 
performances creates an understanding of that movement as being just or unfounded. In 
the transition from performative to performance we not only see the democratic paradox, 
we see how an emergent, deconstructive discourse can re-create a community of equals 
that now includes a new subjectivity. 
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2.3.2 The Double Movement of Politics 
A shortcoming of Rancière’s theory of politics, continued by many celebratory 
applications of Rancière’s theory to contemporary politics, is the unidirectional 
examination of equality. Rancière claims politics is solely the demand for equality by 
some excluded subjectivity. May (2010) uses this definition to celebrate various forms of 
resistance and movements as part of Rancière’s politics. What this conceptualization and 
work built on it lacks is an understanding of politics where both demands for equality and 
exclusion can equally be present in politics.  
Looking at the exclusionary aspects of politics means drawing on the same logic 
of equality that separates the politics of equality from governmental politics. The key is 
to understand the relationship between the excluder and (potentially) excluded. A 
struggle to keep or to further exclude some subjectivity from a community of equals 
would fall under governmental politics. In this instance, the members of the community 
of equals are attempting to cement the boundaries of that community so that the excluded 
part remains outside the community. But when some members of a community of equals 
seek to remove another group from that community, the Politics of Equals is in play. 
Here the boundaries of equality are in question, and membership in the community is at 
stake in the struggle.  
 The history of the double movement of politics in the US is quite apparent in the 
civil sphere, especially surrounding voter rights. The rise of Jim Crow laws sought to 
deny African Americans the nominal equality they were granted with the passing of the 
15th amendment. In a lesser-known example, single and widowed female property 
owners in New Jersey had voting rights from 1776 until 1807, but became 
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disenfranchised as political opportunism and gender ideologies of domesticity placed this 
version of civil equality on the chopping block (Klinghoffer and Elkis 1992). Members of 
democratic society often restrict the boundaries on who is a member of the community of 
equals in various spheres. The result is a theory of politics that is potentially as much 
about the politics of inequality as it is the politics of equality. 
 
2.3.3 The Politics of Equals 
 The Politics of Equals is built around a peculiar paradox of democracy: no matter 
the attempts to create or claim equality in a democratic system, inequalities persist 
(Rancière 1999: 16). Applied to sociology, this means recognizing the narrowing effects 
of the coalescence and institutionalization of social movements. Radical reconfigurations 
of society may only apply to a narrow grouping of subjectivities, or only in one particular 
sphere. Other subjectivities and spheres remain based in some form of unequal relations 
seen as just, “natural”, or even as a positive factor in building solidarity. Because politics 
is based in performatives of equality, the Politics of Equals cannot locate politics in 
particular spheres or based in particular social causes. Politics must remain non-
determined and de-centered in order for sociology to capture any and all political 
moments. Finally, moments of politics must also be viewed as reconstructing the social 
order to produce more inequality. The history of democratic politics shows the continual 
struggle between granting or removing rights to some portion of the population. The 
Politics of Equals moves beyond Rancière’s one-way formulation to argue that politics 
cannot be viewed entirely in a celebratory manner that suggests society is moving 
towards a more equal condition. Instead, the Politics of Equals takes for granted that the 
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equality of subjectivities in any sphere is continually in question, and can be altered in 
any fashion. 
  
2.4 Conclusion 
At first glance, translating Rancière to the social sciences appears to be a fool’s 
errand. A version of politics that goes beyond social identities and locations seems 
incompatible with a discipline that tries to root human action and behavior in the social 
world. Rancière says as much through his critiques of Bourdieu, where a sociological 
framework meant to fight inequality in actuality recreates it in multiple fields (Pelletier 
2009b). However, the attempts across the social sciences to integrate Rancière’s 
philosophy with empirical works on the social field shows the appeal of understanding 
politics as the enactment of equality.  
To successfully translate Rancière to sociology, it means accepting the democratic 
paradox in terms of politics itself and the study of it; recognizing the difference between 
a politics of equality and governmental politics when studying political moments and 
movements; and recognizing the nondetermined relationship between the social world 
and political moments. The paradox, as discussed above, is the difference between the 
radical enactments of equality at an individualized level with the limited 
institutionalizations of equality that may result from these political moments. This 
movement expands on Rancière’s definition of politics by looking at how society 
responds to political moments. In accepting this paradox, sociology can incorporate 
Rancière’s insights on the ephemeral nature of politics alongside social mechanisms of 
politics and political movements. 
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The difference between the Politics of Equals and governmental politics provides 
an analytic framework from which to understand the stake of action in political 
movements. Be they progressive or regressive, actors and groups make and re-articulate 
demands that may or may not affect the membership of a community of equals. This 
difference in political logic can be found at any level of politics – individualized 
moments and collective action. Knowing the difference between the two allows sociology 
to better understand how politics can affect the larger social world. 
Finally, the political must remain undetermined by social factors. Elaborated in 
more depth in the following chapter, this aspect of Rancièrean sociology is meant to 
minimize the impact of research that denies the voice to unseen or unrecognized 
subjectivities. When social scientists base their analysis on already existing social 
categories or identities, the possibility of other or new identities is removed. This is not to 
say that the social world is unrelated to the emergence of politics. Instead, it is meant to 
leave open the possibility of politics in locations and subjectivities that we as researchers 
cannot see in this or any particular moment. Politics here is a universal concept, and must 
be separated from our particular, contextualized understanding of the social world. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE POLITICS OF EQUALS AND THE BOUNDLESSNESS OF POLITICS 
3.1 Introduction 
 The question of equality has been a central feature of myriad sociological studies 
of politics. Equality has been treated as the end goal of politics in general, to the goal in 
certain spheres of life, to one claim among many in a political field. The relationship 
between politics and equality is simple: politics is the means for some excluded group to 
gain equality. But what if, drawing on the philosophy of Jacques Rancière, one treats 
equality not as an end goal, but a starting point (Rancière 1991: 138)? Rethinking what 
equality is opens up commonly held assumptions in sociology about the definition of the 
political, or the essence of politics, and what studying politics entails.  
 This chapter seeks to build a blueprint for a generalized theory of politics as the 
process of equality, be it the increase or decrease of equality in a specific setting. Inspired 
by the political philosophy of Jacques Rancière, the question of politics and the political 
is examined next to some common theories and epistemologies of politics in sociology. 
Though this Rancière-inspired discussion finds sympathies and analogues in sociology, 
none of these theories provide a generalized or universal understanding of the politics of 
equality free from reductionist and determinist thinking. Sociological studies of politics 
suffer from ontological and epistemological problems that lead to an overly narrow 
analytical framework from which to understand politics in relation to society. 
 Jacques Rancière’s unique definition of politics treats the political solely as the 
demand for equality coming from an excluded subjectivity. This definition, which is 
limited in scope yet radical in form, has increasingly been studied, applied, and critiqued 
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in the social sciences (Schaap 2011; Pelletier 2009a; Dean 2009; Tambakaki 2009). Yet 
Rancière himself appears wary of such translations to the social sciences. In his Ten 
Theses on Politics (2001) and “L’éthique de la sociologie,” (1984) Rancière uses Pierre 
Bourdieu as a foil to show the problem of having social scientists study politics and 
equality. The problem, from Rancière’s standpoint, is that social studies of politics reduce 
the political, or the essence of politics, to the social. Rancière sees the social as meaning 
three distinct things, 
First, it can mean ‘society’, that is, the set of groups, places and functions that the 
police logic identifies with the whole of the community… There is also a notion 
of the social as polemical dispositif of subjectivation, constructed by subjects who 
rise up to contest the ‘naturalness’ of these places and functions by having 
counted what I call the part of those without part. Lastly, there is the social qua 
invention of modern metapolitics: that is, the social as the – more or less hidden – 
truth of politics, whether this truth is conceived in the manner of Marx, Émile 
Durkheim, of de Tocqueville or of Pierre Bourdieu (Rancière 2010c: 95-6). 
 
Rancière’s critique of sociology is largely based in this third meaning. Be it economic 
determinism, cultural determinism, or some other ontology of the social, Rancière finds 
that these versions create an intermixing of police and political logics that have brought 
on “the end of politics” (Rancière 1999: 92). The result is a depoliticizing action that in 
fact cements certain forms of inequality (Rancière 2001; Rancière 1991: 133-4). Drawing 
on this insight, but denying that sociological studies of politics are always depoliticizing, 
this chapter seeks to rethink the relationship between the political and sociological 
theories of politics. Instead of seeing overdetermined theories of politics where actors are 
merely reacting and responding to causative social structures, a sociological theory of the 
politics of equality takes account of social structures without placing them as causative 
forces. Social structures and institutions set the stage, so to speak. 
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 From works based in the classical theoretical positions of Marx and Weber to 
contemporary research of identity politics, Foucault, and Bourdieu, Rancière’s theory of 
democracy and equality has a number of similarities yet remains distinct from these 
avenues of research. Compared to how sociologists define the political, the Rancièrean 
version of the political is a radical re-imagining of the constitution of politics. In fact, 
sociology lacks a strong dialogue over what constitutes the political, especially in the 
sub-discipline of political sociology. Rancièrean political sociology explicitly bases 
studies of politics in a definition of the political as the logic of disagreement, or the 
demand for equality. 
 This sociological model is similar to what Nash (2000) calls “New Political 
Sociology.” This category, generally speaking, deals with issues of culture, identity, and 
power. These works move political sociology away from political economy, the state, and 
power, yet keep politics in dialogue with other social forces and the state. A Rancière-
inspired version of politics is broad enough to incorporate numerous frameworks of 
studying politics, so long as the autonomy of the political remains. In order to keep this 
autonomy, social institutions must be seen as mechanisms that can allow a possibility of 
the political moment to happen, and to show how the demand for equality becomes (or 
fails to become) institutionalized and part of a new social order.  
 Compared to the generalized epistemology of political sociology, this version 
political sociology – the politics of equality – is unique in its use of a different set of 
assumptions surrounding both politics and society. It is a symbolic theory centered on 
equality, but in a non-determinist way. Social forces are important to understand the 
mechanisms of the political process, though they cannot predict how or when a political 
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moment can arise. This theory treats the state as neither essential nor inessential to 
politics, focusing more on the emergence and content of the political moment. Though 
not all aspects of the politics of equality can be discussed here, this paper seeks to 
construct the ontological and epistemological bases of this decentered, symbolic, and 
non-determining theory.  
 
3.2 Ontology: The Political and Politics in Sociology 
 Before a discussion of how politics is understood in sociology, its relationship to 
the political needs further clarification. To repeat, the political for Rancière is the logic of 
disagreement, or the demand for equality. A particularized form of conflict, then, makes 
up the essence of what constitutes politics. Sociology often directly adopts influences 
from political philosophers like Arendt (Krause 2008; Somers 2006; Orloff 2012), 
Tocqueville (Bellah et al. 1985; Putnam 2000; Goldberg 2001), Dewey (Emirbayer and 
Goldberg 2005), and others (Calhoun 1992; Nash 2002; Boltanski and Chiapello 2005; 
Bilici 2012). Some of these works, like Calhoun’s edited volume on Habermas, build an 
explicit sociological framework that incorporates the normative bases of that theory into a 
functioning sociological theory. Sociological studies do engage with political philosophy 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Goldberg 2001; Krause 2008), and major debates in that 
field, from the Dahl (1961) and Mills (1956) split between pluralist and elite theories of 
governance to Marxist works on the autonomy of the state, have at the least been based in 
debates surrounding theoretical interpretation and epistemological assumptions on the 
political. Krause’s (2008) use of Arendt to analyze the condition of undocumented 
migrants and refugees in contemporary Europe expertly shows the degree of their 
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domination and lack of rights while at the same time show how these groups can 
mobilize and gain rights from the state. Political philosophy and social science intertwine 
to further our understandings of rights, statelessness and domination among migrants and 
refugees. Yet many times theoretical works in political sociology fails to carry on an 
explicit dialogue with the political philosophers they reference, even though the dialogue 
may be implicit (Dahl 1961), or some concepts made “testable” (Bellah et al. 1985). 
Political philosophy remains in the background providing base assumptions in 
sociological works of politics, and the normative base of these theories are there but not 
dealt with in any reflexive method.  
 On the other hand, political philosophy and theory lacks a detailed understanding 
of the social, or the institutions, structures, identities, and practices that shape human 
action. From Arendt’s “right to have rights” to Agamben’s “state of exception,” political 
philosophers have drawn on history to further their own argument to varying degrees of 
success. However, these works generally lack a sophisticated dialogue with social and 
political structures as they exist, and at times critique other philosophers for adding 
elements of contextualization or temporality. Badiou (2005), whose version of politics is 
in many ways similar to Rancière’s, criticizes Rancière for having a temporal version of 
politics. For Badiou, a true philosophy of the political must transcend the contextual, 
temporal mess of the social world. Jean-Luc Nancy (2010), though more concerned with 
the social world than Badiou, bases democracy in a determining spirit of “man who 
infinitely transcends man” (15). Democracy is not a political form per se, but a relational 
form where politics can arise (15). Again, political philosophy looks for the base of 
democracy in something other than the social, be it some essence or philosophical truth. 
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To build a sociological theory of the political, society and practiced politics must not be 
taken as “black boxes” (Latour 1987), yet they cannot be determining factors of the 
theory. An integration of philosophical and sociological insight is needed. 
 Coming from the field of philosophy, Rancière builds a theory of the political 
based on the unequal distribution of parts in a society and the interruption of this 
distribution by those without a part.4 Like Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction, this 
relationship and interruption must be present for any form of politics to occur. Politics, as 
opposed to the political, is paradoxically both central and peripheral to the philosophy of 
Rancière. Chambers (2011) argues that Rancière’s politics-as-interruption places it 
squarely in the realm of action, leaving “pure” politics (or the political) as something that 
cannot be entirely removed from social relations. On the other hand, politics entails a 
specificity and temporality that distances an instance of politics from the universality of 
the political.5 Rancière’s definition of politics is based in an abstracted ideal – the 
interruption of an excluded subjectivity with the demand for equality. Sociology, 
however, starts from the realm of politics (in society) and uses insights based in empirical 
studies of politics to move towards a definition of the political. With exceptions coming 
from certain strains of identity politics and “power relations” of gender, race, or class, the 
political in sociology is generally referred to as the public relationship between a 
                                                
4 Chambers (2011) argues that Rancière himself claims his work does not constitute a theory of politics or 
the political. This debate, however, is not germane to the project of relating his philosophy to political 
sociology. 
5 This is not to say other philosophers have not tried to bring Rancière’s political towards empirical 
politics. May (2010) analyzes an anarchist social movement to show Rancière’s political as a practiced 
form of politics. His work, while showing the relevance of the interruption and disagreement for equality in 
democratic politics, lacks a key component of analyses of politics in sociology: links to the social. 
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collective and the state.6 While this inductive approach to understanding the political is 
fruitful for understanding the basis of politics in society, Rancière critiques it for reducing 
the political to part of the social realm (Rancière 2001). In other words, sociological 
approaches to politics turn any political into the social. 
 Addressing the two fields in his “Ten Theses on Politics,” Rancière believes that 
the “end of politics” and “return of politics” camps exemplify the problem of 
contemporary understandings of politics – that they in fact suppress politics: 
the debate between the philosophers of the ‘return of politics’ and the sociologists 
of the ‘end of politics’ is thus a straightforward debate regarding the order in 
which it is appropriate to take the presuppositions of ‘political philosophy’ so as 
to interpret the consensualist practice of annihilating politics (Rancière 2001 10: 
33). 
 
Speaking to sociology specifically, Rancière argues that politics is reduced to studying 
the social, and that the moments of politics, or the interruption, cannot be properly seen 
or understood through a sociological lens. There is a logic of the political and a logic of 
the social, and neither can replace or determine the other (Rancière 2001 10: 33). 
 Rancière’s critique need not be taken as a paralyzing one that prevents any use of 
his philosophy in the social sciences. Rather than having the social or political replace 
one another, this project attempts to keep the political as an autonomous ontological 
space, but to show how it is related to the social when it becomes politics in the empirical 
world. The problem with the common definition of the political in sociology is only 
partially based in its reliance on the social to understand the political. Its main problem is 
that it is limiting the boundaries of where politics can occur. The political as a public, 
                                                
6 This definition is most clearly seen in Tilly’s (2006) stated preference for defining politics as involving 
the “government,” though he accepts a broader version of politics as “interactions involving the exercise of 
power…” (410). Similar state-centric definitions are found in Orloff (2012). Orloff draws on Zerilli’s 
(2005) definition of the political in her own argument to go beyond the current Instrumentalist-Culturalist 
divide in political sociology. 
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collective relationship with the state makes the “space” of politics take precedence over 
any logic or analytic of politics. A theory of politics based in Rancière’s political cannot 
be predetermined by place, setting, or institutions. This theory, the politics of equality, 
provides a sociological account of politics and political action attuned to allowing any 
excluded subjectivity to be heard and understood in their own voice. 
 Politics need not be collective in its traditional sense. Collective is often used as a 
“black box” meant to mean a sizable group of people. The politics of equality can be 
found in any relationship between subjects, as any and all relationships contain roles, 
parts, and (in)equality. The personal can in fact become the political, as Rancière writes, 
The domestic household has been turned into a political space not through the 
simple fact that power relationships are at work in it but because it was the subject 
of argument in a dispute over the capacity of women in the community (Rancière 
1999: 32-33). 
 
At the same time, we see that politics need not be public as well. The household, and 
challenges to domestic roles are clearly part of the private sphere, and need not enter into 
the public sphere for equality in the household to occur. The same can be true in other 
spheres, like labor.  
A strike is not political when it calls for reforms rather than a better deal or when 
it attacks the relationships of authority rather than the inadequacy of wages.  It is 
political when it reconfigures the relationships that determine the workplace in its 
relation to the community (Rancière 1999: 32-33). 
 
A strike is not necessarily part of the public sphere, as it can take place entirely in the 
workplace, and may not enter into the public sphere. Yet a strike can be politics. Again 
we see the limits of space placed on politics by the normal conception of the political in 
sociology. 
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 Finally, the politics of equality challenges the assertion that the state must be 
present for politics to exist. Both the examples of the husband and wife and the strike 
present politics where the state can, but is not necessary for politics to occur. The state 
can be, but is not necessarily present when workers are attempting to reconfigure their 
relationship with management, or a spouse challenges their role in the household. 
Because the political for Rancière is based in the interruption of the system of parts and 
places in a community, this interruption can happen in spheres that are separated form the 
state.  
 This politics of equality must treat the political (or the moment of politics itself) 
as something separate, though not completely autonomous, from the social. The 
emancipatory potential of Rancière’s politics comes form the fact that it is not determined 
by social causes, which as part of the police, put blinders on what is “there,” or what 
identities and subjectivities may or may not exist in society. Politics emerges from 
beyond the social and the limits it sets on who or what is “there.” What needs to be 
shown is the social, historical, or cultural contingencies that allow for the possibility of 
the interruption to occur, and how the interruption can move from a singular moment to 
some form of enacted change in the community of equals. Sociological forces shape the 
landscape in which the political moment may arise, what form it takes, and how it 
produces change. The result is a theory of politics that is attuned to, but not determined 
by, the social. 
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3.3 Epistemology: Strains of Political Sociology 
 Rancière argues that the social sciences are guilty of two depoliticizing 
tendencies. The first is to reduce the political to the social, and the second is to keep the 
political confined to the actions of the state, which annihilates politics (Rancière 2001: 
10:33). Instead of rejecting any possibility of reconciling Rancière’s harsh critique of 
sociology with empirical versions of political sociology, a close examination shows both 
the problems Rancière mentions and certain similarities between the two projects that 
allow for the possibility of politics that keeps the political autonomous to a degree. 
Rancière’s politics can, to varying degrees, be used alongside many versions of political 
sociology to create a more nuanced understanding of equality, so long as the political 
remains relatively autonomous and decentered. Autonomy of the political means 
sociology must deconstruct traditional determinist narratives that link political action to 
other social factors, such as economic or cultural ones. This is not to say there is no 
relation between these factors, but that social factors in themselves cannot predict when 
political moments will occur. At the same time, decentering politics opens the space from 
which we can look for politics. Politics need not be limited to the state and civil society.  
Treating the political as a logic both opens up the location of where politics 
occurs and challenges sociologists to not simplify a political event to a social one. Social 
structures, be they class, culture, institutions, and even history are not causal factors 
leading to political interruptions. These forces show how a moment can arise, but not 
predict if it will happen. These moments of politics are ephemeral and semi-autonomous 
from the social, challenging determinist and reductionist theories of politics that root 
political action in other social factors. From traditional works in the discipline on power 
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and domination (Domhoff 1996; Jessop 1999, Burawoy 1979), to more sophisticated 
theories of politics and the social (Bourdieu 1984, 1991; Foucault 2007; 2008), these 
works show how structures, institutions (Berezin 1997; Adams 2010), culture (Bellah et. 
al 1985; Putnam 2000), and power (Rose and Miller 1992; Miller and Rose 1995; Gupta 
2012) create particular forms of politics and political identities. Where the politics of 
equality shares general similarities, in particular with works treating politics as a 
disruption of power relations, Rancière’s philosophy challenges one to create a 
sociological theory of politics that is relatively autonomous form these social forces. 
Rancière’s non-determining theory, and its recognition of stratification in all spheres 
independently of others sets his work apart from this group. Politics cannot be entirely 
reduced to a social cause. In the politics of equality, social forces are the cause of politics, 
but instead work as explanations that show how a political moment can emerge. 
 The politics of equality also continues the tradition of broadening the space or 
location from where politics can occur. In the same vein as some feminist (Butler 1990, 
1997), critical race (Omi and Winant 1994), and Marxist theories, the politics of equality 
looks to private spheres and private lives as potential spaces of politics. This framework 
is in direct contrast to dominant theories of political sociology. Seen in the classical work 
of Weber, and contemporary works of Tilly (1978), Skocpol (1979) and others (Foucault 
2007; Orloff 1999; Steinmetz 1999), tying politics to the state has a long and dominant 
position in political sociology.7 For this approach, politics cannot exist without the state 
being involved in some way. Through examining topics such as state building (Steinmetz 
                                                
7 This is by no means the only tradition though. Feminist politics, for example, often times locates politics 
in the private sphere, and as will be discussed, the literature on labor movements oftentimes treats politics 
as something occurring between owners and workers. Anthropology also has a broader conception of where 
politics can occur (see Baiocchi and Connor 2008). 
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1999); the welfare state (Offe 1984; Hicks and Misra 1993; Orloff 1999); social 
movements (McAdam 1982; Snow and Benford 1992; Paley 2001; Fantasia and Hirsch 
1995; Berezin 2009); nationalism (Smith 1983; Gellner 1983; Calhoun 1997; Anderson 
1991; Brubaker 2004); and electoral politics (Mahler 2006; McAdam and Su 2002), this 
strain of political sociology’s strength is its ability to see the permeations of the state in 
myriad facets of society. Yet the politics of equality does not limit politics solely to the 
state. This conception of politics is limited in terms of content, but broad in terms of 
location. Private spheres and everyday life become potential sites of politics, locations 
where the state may or may not be present. There is no primacy of location.  
 
3.3.1 The Overdetermination of the Social 
 For sociology, linking social factors to politics is obviously and justifiably at the 
center of sociological studies of politics. From classical works tying class and status to 
political organization (Weber 1978; Mills 1956) to contemporary works studying culture 
and politics (Alexander 2003; Jacobs 2000; Smith 2006) and the state’s role in 
reproducing inequalities (Bourdieu 1996; Ong 2003), sociology provides rich evidence 
linking politics to myriad social structures, forces, and identities. The politics of equality 
is sympathetic to, but quite distinct from this version of political sociology. It is 
sympathetic with Marxist and post-Marxist political sociology, Bourdieu, and Foucault in 
its concern with equality and systems of domination. It is distinct in that while it is 
necessary to understand politics in relation to the social, it cannot be determined by the 
social. The social, Rancière argues, sets limits to the boundaries of who and what are 
“there,” or who exists as a subjectivity and what rights they are entitled to (Rancière 
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1984; Ross 1991; Pelletier 2009). There is no constant social factor that can explain or 
predict a moment of Rancière’s politics. Economics, culture, patriarchy, racism, and more 
do not cause politics in and of themselves. The political moment is ephemeral. Political 
moments are rooted in social conditions, but they cannot be the cause of the politics. 
Instead, the social should be viewed as the realm where the conditions for a political 
moment are constructed, but there are no guarantees a political interruption will happen. 
 The economic sphere is one, but certainly not the only social factor that 
oftentimes is used to explain and predict politics. Power, culture, sexism, racism, and 
colonialism, among others, are all institutions and mechanisms that have been claimed as 
the basis of politics in certain settings. As such, they all determine politics to be based in 
their structure or mechanism of choice. Economics is perhaps the most noted of these 
thanks to myriad discussions of determinism and the role of the state in Marxist circles. 
However, the use of determinism here is meant to apply to all forms social explanations 
of politics, a different definition than the traditional Marxist one. The economic sphere is 
examined as one example of sociological theories of politics reducing the political 
moment of interruption into something caused by the social. 
 Generally found in empirical works that study resistance and compliance to 
domineering forms of labor and the state (Burawoy 1979, 1985; Fantasia 1989; Clawson 
2003), and in works that relate the state in terms of global capitalism (Jessop 1999; 
Appadurai 1996), politics-as-economics understands politics as a vehicle that manages 
citizens and produces resistance under the constraint of the global capitalist system. The 
struggle for equality is central to some, though not all of these works. No matter the focus 
on equality or the state or any other factor, politics-as-economics ineluctably reduces 
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politics as the result of actions in the political-economic order. The determining force of 
the economic sphere, and capitalism in particular, takes primacy as the main force that 
creates politics and can lead to political change. 
 Rose and Miller (1992) examine welfarism as a technology of governance, or “a 
domain of strategies, techniques and procedures” where authorities attempt to make 
passive connections to various subjectivities (183). The point, they argue, is that the 
liberal state attempts to manage realms outside of politics, drawing on myriad actors and 
experts in the private sphere to further their goals. Doctors, philanthropists, and other 
actors outside the realm of the state work alongside state agencies and institutions to help 
manage citizens for the neoliberal state. Citizenship has shifted from based in civic 
obligations to being based “in the energetic pursuit of personal fulfillment and the 
incessant calculations that are to enable this to be achieved” (Rose and Miller 1992: 201). 
While this analysis rightly shows the shifting nature of state-society relations in the 
neoliberal state, it is worthy of critique. Technologies of governance reduce politics to 
decentered power relations, turning Rancière’s politics into police. Police, as Rancière 
envisions it, suppresses the political by focusing solely on managing relations as they 
exist, not examining the possibility of subjectivities excluded from this process.  
 A more complex conceptualization of politics comes from Bourdieu. His nuanced 
account of the interrelation of fields, capitals, and habitus in the reproduction of 
inequality makes him more attuned to material and symbolic forms of power and 
domination. Though Bourdieu never created an explicit theory of politics, his work does 
understand politics in a sophisticated relation between actors, structures, and power 
(Wacquant 2004). Bourdieu’s conceptions of field and symbolic power provide an 
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explanation of “normalized” social relations that are quite complimentary with Rancière’s 
police and natural order. Where Rancière sees police as the mechanism that (re-)produces 
the stable, natural order that maintains an unequal distribution of parts in society, 
Bourdieusian politics would characterize this as the presence of symbolic power in the 
political field. 
 Where symbolic power provides a strong sociological analogue to Rancière, his 
other major concepts start to move Bourdieu’s politics away from Rancière’s non-
determined theory of politics, especially in terms of the relationship between those who 
hold and exercise power and those who do not (Bourdieu 1991: 170). For Bourdieu, this 
formation is based in the relationship between social classes, cultural capital, and state 
institutions that reproduce these structured relationships. The state and state-run 
education systems, he argues, produce a system where elites and other high-capital 
classes are given the legitimacy to enter politics and others are largely excluded from 
entering into positions of power in the state bureaucracy (Bourdieu 1996; 1999). In other 
words, people entering the world into privileged positions have the economic, social, and 
cultural capital to reproduce the social system that provides them with a disproportionate 
amount of those capitals.  
 Despite some similarities that translate well to Rancièrean political sociology, 
Bourdieu’s politics and sociology lead to depoliticizing outcomes. Alexander (2003) 
critiques Bourdieu’s conception of culture, arguing that Bourdieu cannot separate culture 
from the economic sphere, leading to a version of culture that is not autonomous from the 
economic sphere (18-19). Ultimately, Alexander claims, Bourdieusian politics reduce 
culture to be an affect of economic relations, which bestow actors with a base amount of 
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various capitals. Bilici (2012) also criticizes Bourdieu in similar terms, claiming that 
Bourdieu reduces all social relations to power relations (20). In terms of politics, 
Bourdieu’s theories have the same risk – the political, and those who gain power in 
politics, is largely determined by one’s habitus and set of capitals.8 The field of politics 
and the rules that structure it are largely static, leaving the possibility of deconstructing 
stable relationships in the field impossible. Rancière (1984) critiques Bourdieu and 
sociology in general for this type of reductionist thinking. The result of basing studies of 
politics in existing boundaries of the social order and determining forces leads to a 
depoliticization that denies the possibility of some outside discourse that can challenge 
the current order (Ross 1991; Pelletier 2009a). Through studying the political field as it 
exists, Bourdieusian studies of politics merely confirm the inequalities present in the 
field. There is no space for other subjectivities or other forms of discourse. Rancièrean 
political sociology attempts to keep in mind “democracy to come,” Derrida’s (1994) 
formulation of the promise of democracy: 
A democracy to come… is not a democracy that will come in the future, but a 
democracy emploted within a different time, a different temporal plot. The time of 
a ‘democracy to come’ is the time of a promise that has to be kept even though – 
and precisely because – it can never be fulfilled. It is a democracy that can never 
‘reach itself’, catch up with itself, because it involves an infinite openness to the 
Other or the newcomer (Rancière 2010a: 58-9). 
 
This openness is not present in Bourdieusian sociology. Bourdieu’s fields and structuring 
structures close off potentialities for the Politics of Equals to exist. 
 The politics of equality shares a number of features with this approach in political 
sociology. First, like many Marxist versions of political sociology, absolute equality is, if 
                                                
8 A related critique from Rancière (2004) is that Bourdieu (and sociologists in general) reproduce inequality 
by focusing only on what exists as they see it. By creating scholarship on inequality and measuring the 
degrees of inequality and separation, this work reinforces the boundaries between equals and the excluded 
(See Pelletier 2009a, 2009b). 
 53 
not a goal, then a process worth striving towards. However, the drawbacks to this 
epistemological tradition are the reductionist tendencies to place social explanations as 
the defining, and at times determining sphere of politics. This approach clearly shows 
Rancière’s critique that sociology destroys the political by turning it into the social. To 
use more abstract language, sociological studies of politics predetermine what is “there.” 
Sociological studies of politics cannot account for anything beyond the gaze of the social 
scientist, who depoliticizes because they set boundaries on who or what is “there.” 
Sociology then can only study political moments that have happened. The field lacks an 
ability to predict or understand a moment of politics that could emerge from a new 
subjectification, or something beyond the realm of what sociology defines as “there.” 
Sociological studies of politics are in fact studies of police. Rancière defines 
police as both the totality of governing activity that falls outside politics and as the 
“partition of the sensible,”  
…[C]haracterized by the absence of a void or a supplement: society consists of 
groups dedicated to specific modes of action, in places where these occupations 
are exercised, in modes of being corresponding to these occupations and these 
places. In this fittingness of functions, places, and ways of being, there is no place 
for a void.  It is this exclusion of what “there is not” that is the police-principle at 
the heart of statist practices (Rancière 2001: 7:21).  
 
For Rancière politics emerges from this void. “Politics,” he writes, “is not made up of 
power relationships; it is made up of relationships between worlds” (Rancière 1999: 42). 
The void is the space from where subjectivities draw on the world where all speaking 
beings are equal to alter the distribution of parts and bodies in the police order (Rancière 
2001: 7:21). Sociological analyses that attempt to explain politics where the social is used 
as the causal factor leave no space for this void. The boundaries of the political are 
already inscribed; no new relationships between worlds are possible. The politics of 
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equality keeps the political (relatively) autonomous from other spheres in order to study 
politics. The result is to provide a deeper, more contextualized understanding of the 
relationship between society and the political where neither factor determines the other. 
 
3.3.2 Decentering Politics 
 For much of political sociology, politics is ineluctably linked to the state. Either in 
terms of groups in civil society engaging the state through social movements, electoral 
politics, and revolutions, or from the state’s role in managing populations and dealing 
with social movements and various other citizen demands, the state plays a major role in 
what is traditionally considered politics. From revolutions (Skocpol 1979) to community-
building (Lichterman 1996), the former grouping shows how actors and institutions play 
a part in the potential change of some aspect of the state. The latter, found in 
governmentality studies (Gupta 1995; Ong 2003) and studies of the state or state 
institutions themselves (Scott 1998; Glaeser 2000), focus on how a state incorporates, 
manages, includes and excludes various subjectivities. Rancièrean political sociology 
does not reject the importance of the state in politics. But it does recognize that the state 
is only one sphere in which politics can occur. Politics – the interruption of the natural 
order with the demand for equality – can occur in any sphere of life, from the civil sphere 
to the economic or domestic spheres. The incorporation of private spheres as locations of 
politics makes Rancièrean political sociology unique from models that are state-centered 
or “bring the state back in” (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985). The state is 
merely one location, albeit a central one, out of many where politics can occur. 
Decentering politics from the state places Rancièrean political sociology alongside 
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theories of identity politics that stress the importance of the private sphere and struggles 
for rights and equality in those spheres. Not all claims for equality happen, or can be 
resolved in the civil sphere. 
 Numerous studies of politics have studied how social movements and other 
organizations have made claims on various state institutions. These activities have ranged 
from typical community organizing and action (Lichterman 2005; Eliasoph 1998; Wood 
2002) to clientalist networks (Auyero 2001) and even forms of occupation, protest, and 
revolution  (Chatterjee 2004; Tilly 1978; Skocpol 1979; Hansen 1999). What ties these 
studies together is their centering of the state in examining political action. In these 
examples, politics occurs when a group of actors make claims on some level of the state 
for action, services or change. The political moment may or may not be present in these 
accounts. When politics is present, like in Chatterjee’s (2004) study of an excluded group 
acting “as if” they had the right to services the government denied them, we see how the 
state can play a role in the political moment. This role is often as the excluding force, or 
part that attempts to keep the natural order of inequality intact. When the political 
moment is absent, these works are part of Rancière’s police. Police is generally what 
happens when questions of equality and parts are absent from what we usually consider 
to be political actions. Rancière first characterizes police in Disagreement as “the set of 
procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the 
organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for 
legitimizing this distribution [of places and roles]” (Rancière 1999: 28). In focusing on 
processes between movements and the state, and by taking all gains or losses at face 
value, works in this vein depoliticize by uncritically treating all forms of politics as the 
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same. There is no differentiation between a politics of equality and governmental politics 
(police). 
  Another type of politics centers the story more on the state or agents of the state 
themselves, showing how governance affects daily life. From following state institutions 
like the police (Glaeser 2000); welfare and planning agencies (Orloff 1999; Steinmetz 
1993; Ong 2003; Gupta 1995); state building (Skocpol; Adams 1999; Steinmetz 2007; 
Scott 1998); to the state’s presence in public and private life (Berezin 1997; Rose and 
Miller 1992; Navarro-Yashin 2002; Mahmood 2005; Wedeen 1999), these works draw on 
numerous theoretical frameworks to understand how the state deals with, and reacts to, 
demands placed on it. The influence of Foucault is seen in many of these works, since 
Foucault’s conceptualization of power as productive rather than repressive opens up 
avenues from which to see how power operates in regards to the state and various 
subjectivities. Like the previous examination of politics as the social, these works 
centering on the state can contain Rancière’s politics. At the same time, these works, 
especially Foucaultian-inspired works, can easily ignore that moment of interruption, 
focusing entirely on mechanisms of discipline and governmentality, ignoring whether or 
not a political interruption can or did take place. Rancière critiques Foucault on this 
count, claiming “nothing is political in itself merely because power relationships are at 
work in it. For a thing to be political, it must give rise to a meeting of police logic and 
egalitarian logic that is never set up in advance” (Rancière 1999: 32). 
 While all of these accounts of political sociology provide unique insights to a 
generalized definition of politics, it is their location that in fact limits their compatibility 
to a Rancièrean political sociology. All of these works, to paraphrase Tilly (2006), have 
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the state, or at least the specter of it, as an integral part of politics. Rancière’s politics 
cannot be reduced to a singular location. Rancière briefly mentions domestic relations as 
an example of politics. This space, like any other, is built on specific relations between 
parts. The dispute between this relationship is the basis of politics. 
The domestic household has been turned into a political space not through the 
simple fact that power relationships are at work in it but because it was the subject 
of argument in a dispute over the capacity of women in the community (Rancière 
1999: 32-3). 
 
Both the public and private spheres can have political interruptions. So long as a 
relationship of inequality is being challenged, Rancièrean politics is occurring. “Nothing 
is political in itself for the political only happens by means of a principle that does not 
belong to it: equality” (Rancière 1999: 33). Politics transcends any specific, 
predetermined location. Equality, no matter the sphere, is at the essence of politics. There 
is no primacy of location for a decentered politics. 
 Of course, not all studies of politics in sociology have the state as a central part of 
the analysis. Marxist and neo-Marxist works ranging from workplace strikes (Fantasia 
1989) to culture and resistance (Hebdige 1979) look at challenges to the capitalist system. 
Race and critical race theorists have also uncovered moments of politics outside the state, 
examining the role of racist and anti-racist politics in everyday lives (Omi and Winant 
1994). For theorists that treat power relations as politics, the state can also be absent from 
much of their work. This version of politics, oftentimes influenced by Foucault, can take 
place in working life (de Certeau 1984; Pun 2005), the doctor’s office (Miller and Rose 
2008; Cruikshank 1999), and everyday life (Navaro-Yashin 2002; Brown 2006). Finally, 
feminist theory has long championed the “personal as political,” with numerous strains of 
feminism that examine the politics of (in)equality in the household, workplace, and 
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global landscape (Butler 1990; Mohanty 2003). However, with some exceptions, these 
works are not based in a larger, universal theory of politics and the political. Each of 
these strains of research examines politics in a specific sphere or field, but limits 
theoretical speculations to that field. Rancière’s political philosophy goes beyond specific 
spheres and fields and instead looks for unifying themes in political action that can be 
seen across settings. The politics of equality is a theoretical model that can apply to all 
settings where politics can occur, providing a more generalized theory of politics 
sympathetic to many specific theories of politics. 
 
3.4 Politics as Equality 
 Reading through some examples of contemporary political sociology alongside a 
Rancièrean model of politics leaves us with a number of criticisms and provides some 
openings for the politics of equality to take root. Though this perspective shares 
similarities with other concepts and ideas in political sociology, its unique set of 
assumptions surrounding the political keep it distinct from these other theories of politics. 
So what is the politics of equality, or a Rancière-inspired theory of politics for the social 
sciences? Many sociological theories of politics, to varying degrees, fail to live up to their 
radical instincts. By focusing on issues like what causes politics, where it can occur, and 
what relationships can constitute political ones, sociologists in fact preclude subjectivities 
and spaces from which politics can emerge. As Pelletier (2009a) notes, these studies 
merely cement the unequal relationships present in society. The poor and excluded can 
only remain as such in these studies. What is needed is a way to allow the excluded to 
speak and be heard in their own language. The politics of equality seeks out spaces, 
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discourses, and actions that refute or disrupt constructions of citizen/subject, 
owner/worker, sophisticate/plebian, and any other where some subjectivity is precluded 
from being treated and heard as an equal.  
The politics of equality must treat politics and equality as a process of challenging 
and moving the symbolic borders of who is equal or unequal, and who “exists” as a real 
subjectivity whose rights cannot be alienated.9 It must keep the political autonomous, yet 
at the same time show how the moment itself is related to various social factors. As much 
as political moments are related to social forces, these social forces and structures cannot 
predetermine the subjects or sites of politics. Not allowing the political any autonomy is a 
depoliticizing action that prevents social scientists from understanding how radical 
demands for equality can emerge. Finally, the place of politics must be de-localized. 
Since the process of politics and equality can challenge any relationship or community, 
the place of politics also cannot be predetermined. Distinctions between public and 
private spheres, or politics and power fail to understand that even though everything is 
not political, everything has the potential to be political. Taking these lessons into 
account helps create a sociological theory of politics that is irreducible and non-
determining, and also connected to society and institutions. For this to happen, the focus 
should be on the process of politics, not on any defining structure, location, or essence. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 These borders of equality have the potential to both expand and contract. Rancière does not look at 
politics as the contraction of the community of equals; however, the history of democracy has numerous 
examples of people losing previously held rights. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NATURAL ORDER AND ITS CONTRADICTIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
Interruptions of the police order with demands for equality do not emerge out of 
nothing – they are the products of myriad social, historical, and cultural conditions that 
have created exclusions to the community of equals. A “natural order” exists that 
precludes various subjectivities from being truly equal. This natural order for Rancière is 
a social construction that treats the given unequal distribution of parts and roles in a 
community as natural (Rancière 1999: 16). In the case of women’s rights, the natural 
order placed women in a more or less separate caste than men – one that excluded women 
from active participation in democratic governance, certain legal rights, and religious 
roles, among other things.  
Often understood as “republican motherhood,” women in the early and mid 19th 
century found themselves based largely in the private sphere, based in the rationalization 
that women’s moral qualities precluded them from participating as equals in the larger 
public sphere (Ryan 1992; Gurko 1976; Isenberg 1998). The recognition that the “natural 
order” was one where women were without part comes from the condition of women in 
numerous spheres of life. Marilley (1996) lists four intertwining premises for this natural 
order. These justifications were used as a response for women’s equality in both public 
and private spheres:  
(1) that God ordained women to serve men’s desires, (2) that women consented to 
obey men in exchange for protection, and so, as men’s natural subjects, women 
can never be men’s equals, (3) that if women vote, put earning first, or become 
too educated, the family will lose its main caretaker and society will lose one of 
its basic structures, and (4) that because women are ‘good persons,’ they cannot 
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be ‘good citizens’: good citizens must sometimes engage in bad behavior 
(Marilley 1996: 9). 
 
During the mid 19th century, however, more women began to notice cracks in these 
orders that placed women in subordinate positions. Women began to more publicly 
question their roles in Church, state, the home, and work. It was the rejection of these 
unequal orders and the demand for equality – democratic, legal, domestic, and religious – 
that was at the heart of the Seneca Falls Convention.  
 To show how the natural order excluded women, and how these orders 
themselves contained contradictions that allowed for a political moment to happen, 
natural orders of the civil and religious spheres will be examined. The main organizers of 
the Seneca Falls Convention, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, drew from lived 
experiences and cultural codes in these spheres in coming to their demands for equality. 
The resulting examination points to two avenues of discussion in terms of resistance and 
solidarity. Resistance to a natural order, or politics, comes from the disconnect between 
lived experience of inequality and the belief that one is in fact equal. Instead of treating 
this resistance in relation to the bourgeoisie; as a minor act against insurmountable 
disciplinary powers (de Certeau 1984); or as a reform of the democratic civil sphere 
(Jacobs 2000; Alexander 2006), Rancière’s politics treats resistance to the natural order 
as something that reconstructs relations between subjects. Treating politics in a 
deconstructive manner gives it an emancipatory potential that Foucaultian and 
Durkheimian theories of politics and resistance lack. A second, more critical dialogue 
arises when placing the question of equality against that of solidarity. Solidarity, as taken 
up by Durkheim and Neo-Durkheimian scholars, is a project that seeks some “ideal” 
social relations that provides a sense of togetherness in a community, where some 
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iteration of it exists as an imperfect, yet relatively ideal solidarity sphere (Alexander 
2006: 31, 194). The relationship between solidarity and the natural order needs critique to 
show that treating solidarity as the “real utopia” (Alexander 2006: 550) emphasizes a 
form of governmental politics that establishes and legitimizes unequal distributions of 
parts and roles. This Rancièrean critique places solidarity studies in the same vein as 
hegemony studies. While both concepts look at social organization from vastly different 
perspectives, for Rancière it makes no difference whether this organization is coercive or 
consensual, forced or spontaneous.  
 
4.2 The Natural Order 
 Rancière does not spend a great deal of time on the concept of the natural order. 
Sometimes referred to as the social order (Rancière 1999: 16), the natural order 
represents the stable, symbolic order that results from police logic and processes 
(Rancière 1999: 31; Rancière 2001: 7:20, 8:22).10 In this order not only are the 
distributions of parts and roles seen as natural, those entirely excluded from this 
distribution are not visible. Police is essential in the maintenance of a natural order, as it 
“asserts that the space of circulating is nothing other than the space of circulation” 
(Rancière 2001: 8:22). The natural order and police work together to treat the given, 
arbitrary division of the community as the only imaginable, and therefore natural one. 
The natural order then is a depoliticizing order, as it attempts to define relations among 
                                                
10 Chambers (2011) critiques Rancière scholars, in particular May (2009), for using the term natural order. 
His critique comes from the philosophical tradition that treats terms like “natural” in their normative and 
existential senses, where “natural” refers to the “ought” or “real.” For social scientists, the natural and 
social orders are taken together more liberally with the assumption that all orders are socially constructed. 
See May (2009), Tambakaki (2009), Hewlett (2007), and Bingham and Biesta (2010) for works that treat 
the natural order as a socially constructed concept. 
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subjectivities as static. There is no place for a subjectivity outside this order to demand 
equality, as the order defines the boundaries of who is “visible” and counted among the 
parts of the community.  
 The natural order, however, should not be thought of as a singular one. As 
discussed in chapter two, politics can occur in numerous spheres, each having their own 
community of equals that places certain groups in positions of privilege and excludes 
others from having that place. It is best to think of the natural order as natural orders, 
where each sphere – civil, religious, economic, etc – contains its own natural order where 
police processes create and maintain a system of inclusion and exclusion. By opening up 
the spheres in which natural orders exist, Rancière differentiates himself from Marxian 
studies of ideology and hegemony, in particular Althusser and Gramsci, but also 
Williams, Laclau and Mouffe, and Zizek.  
 The natural order also brings a critical eye to a second form of understanding 
social order – solidarity. A natural order is based in solidarity to varying degrees. 
Subjects in a community oftentimes view their place in that community as relatively just. 
Political moments break down the bonds of solidarity, as bonds between members in the 
community are broken down and re-imagined. Solidarity, like hegemony, is similar to the 
natural order in that they all deal with social order. But because Rancière links the natural 
order to police practices, it remains linked to the police order, or one that masks and 
justifies inequalities. There may be better and worse forms of solidarity, but like 
hegemony, it masks and naturalizes the inequalities that order is founded upon. 
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4.2.1 Ideology, Hegemony, and the Natural Order 
4.2.1.1 Ideology 
 The natural order has a number of similarities to Gramsci’s hegemony and 
Althusser’s ideology and ideological state apparatus (ISA). What separates Rancière from 
these cultural Marxists is his resistance against placing the economic sphere or capitalism 
in particular as a semi-determining base of the natural order. For Althusser, ideology and 
state apparatuses exist in order to reproduce the relations of production for the economic 
sphere (Althusser 2008 [1971]: 22). As stated in chapter three, Rancière’s politics rejects 
any form of determinism alongside any base-superstructure relation between the 
economic sphere and non-economic ones. This rejection of base-superstructure 
radicalizes the project of equality in that natural orders for each sphere can exist and 
change without ineluctable links to any other sphere. The women’s movement in general 
was related as much to capitalism as it was to Quakerism, abolitionism, and liberal 
political thought, among other influences. Therefore, the natural order should be thought 
of as natural orders of each sphere. Without a singular, semi-determining influence, the 
natural orders of each sphere can all take shape differently. 
 A second difference between Rancière and Althusser is in their use of the terms 
natural order and ideology. For Althusser, ideology is something that creates subjects 
through the process of interpellation (Althusser 2008 [1971]: 45, 48). Ideology here has a 
constitutive force that turns individuals into subjects under that ideology, which allows 
for the reproduction of the relations of labor to continue. Rancière, however, treats the 
natural order as the result of police processes. The natural order (and police) do not 
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produce subjectivities, they attempt to define what exists, or what is “there.” Directly 
addressing Althusser, Rancière says, 
The police is not that law interpellating individuals (as in Althusser’s ‘Hey, you 
there!’)… It is, first of all, a reminder of the obviousness of what is there, or 
rather, of what there isn’t: ‘Move along! There is nothing to see here!’ The police 
says that there is nothing to see on a road, that there is nothing to do but move 
along. It asserts that the space of circulating is nothing other than the space of 
circulation (Rancière 2001: 8:22). 
 
The natural order itself is not creating subjects; it arises from police processes meant to 
manage and maintain the current boundaries of (in)equality in the community of equals.  
 The resulting difference between ideology and the natural order is most important 
when considering the issue Rancière considered essential to politics and struggle in 
general: the role of individuals to speak up and resist. In Althusser’s construction of ISAs 
and interpellation, limits to the possibility of action are extremely constrained. Schools, 
religion, family and the like produce a system of beliefs and action that can only be 
countered through class struggle (Althusser 2008 [1971]: 59-60). The problem with 
Althusser’s ISA and ideology in general is that it is a totalizing structure. It ignores how 
politics and the emergence of new subjectivities can emerge outside of class struggle. 
ISAs do not interpellate us, Rancière argues. Instead, we must think of how they attempt, 
but ultimately fail, to put blinders on what is “there” through the processes of police. For 
Rancière this means jettisoning the concepts of ideology and hegemony, and replacing 
them with the natural order and police, which provide a more concrete definition of how 
stability is created and how resistance can emerge from within that system. 
 Slavoj Zizek’s work on ideology is at first glance nearly identical to Rancière’s 
natural order. Both concepts look to move beyond the problem of false consciousness, 
trying to see how the excluded or unequal generally are aware of and accept their unequal 
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position in society. Their differences lie in the ontological base of their philosophies. For 
Zizek, ideology masks the Real, or the actual conditions of existence for subjects.  
What they overlook, what they misrecognize, is not the reality but the illusion 
which is structuring their reality, their real social activity. They know very well 
how things really are, but still they are doing it as if they did not know. The 
illusion is therefore double: it consists in overlooking the illusion which is 
structuring our real, effective relationship to reality. And this overlooked, 
unconscious illusion is what may be called the ideological fantasy (Zizek 1989: 
32-3). 
 
Drawing on Lacan, he argues that subjects can only experience the Real as a dream (47). 
The Real is represented as a radical desire based in some “traumatic, real kernel, ” or a 
“traumatic social division which cannot be symbolized” (45). The social desire, equality, 
is traumatic because it uncovers the degree of inequality the oppressed find themselves 
mired in. Subjects choose to ignore the Real, or at least its possibility, and therefore 
partake in the ideological fantasy. Zizek’s ideology accounts for individual agency on 
this count, but by drawing on Lacan’s use of the Real, this agency places subjects in a 
position of retreating from the inequalities that make up their social lives. 
Rancière’s political philosophy does not reach back into the mind to find the Real. 
For him, the only assumption he makes on the nature of humans is that they are 
unequivocally equal. The natural order, maintained through police processes, is an 
attempt to mask this truth and to justify exclusions and inequalities. Like Zizek’s 
ideology, we can see the natural order as a structuring element of social life. However, 
even though political interruptions are rare, they show subjects confronting the 
contradictions between the natural order and the equality of all. Or in Zizek’s terms, 
subjects pull the veil on the ideological fantasy masking the traumatic Real of equality. 
 67 
Rancière’s natural order is more fragile, more open to challenges from the part without a 
part.  
 
4.2.1.2 Hegemony 
 Hegemony as a concept is closer in meaning to Rancière’s natural order, though it 
too remains distinct. Based largely in the writings of Gramsci, hegemony is generally 
taken as system of control where dominated classes actively consent to participate in the 
system that creates their own inequalities. Located in the realm of civil society (as 
opposed to the state), hegemony works to ensure stability through consent, with the state 
using coercion to repress challenges to the hegemonic order (Gramsci 1971: 12). Taken 
together, Gramsci sees the state and civil society work together to maintain a stable 
system of control: 
The school as a positive educative function, and the courts as a repressive and 
negative educative function, are the most important State activities in this sense: 
but… a multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities tend to the 
same end – initiatives and activities which form the apparatus of the political and 
cultural hegemony of the ruling classes (Gramsci 1971: 258). 
 
Hegemony, then, is a form of control that is meant to keep the ruling class – the 
bourgeoisie – in power.  
 Though both hegemony and the natural order both attempt to show how stable, 
unequal systems of governance and rule are maintained, there are two main points of 
contention between Rancière and Gramsci’s definition of hegemony. The first comes 
from his separation of coercion and consent, or placing hegemony on the side without 
coercion. For Rancière, the process of police is integral in creating a natural order, as it 
maintains the places and standings of subjects within an order. As Baiocchi and Connor 
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(2013) and May (2008) have argued, Rancière’s police is quite similar to Foucault’s 
governmentality and discipline. These two forms of control, like Rancière’s police, do 
not make a distinction between public and private, or coercive and consensual forms of 
control and power. The distinction between state and civil sphere, or hegemony and 
coercion is not relevant to the same degree for Rancière’s natural order. Police processes, 
be it the courts, classroom, or doctor’s office work together to create the natural order.  
 Second, even though Gramsci uses the organic intellectual and wars of position to 
show where resistance and counter-hegemonic forces can emerge from, at base in his 
theory is an economic determinism, where hegemony and coercion are used to maintain 
the bourgeoisie, or economic elite, as the ruling class. Specifically, Gramsci’s hegemony 
is a theory of the economic sphere. Rancière’s natural order is not a singular one. As 
politics can occur in numerous private or non-civil spheres (as well as the civil sphere), a 
natural order exists in each one, where some group is member of a community of equals, 
and others are excluded from that equality.  
  More contemporary uses of hegemony to varying degrees have deconstructed and 
expanded definitions of hegemony that are closer analogues to the natural order, but by 
and large they do not capture the plural, de-centered order Rancière describes. Williams 
(1977) gives hegemony new life by breaking down the determinism of base-
superstructure relationships in traditional Marxist analysis. Hegemony, he argues, is a 
constant, unfinished relationship, and as such, must always be presented next to counter-
hegemonic. In other words, there is a dominant force, but it is always being recreated and 
contested. 
A lived hegemony is… a realized complex of experiences, relationships, and 
activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits… Moreover… it does 
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not just passively exist as a form of dominance. It has continually to be renewed, 
recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, 
challenged by pressures not at all its own (Williams 1977: 112). 
 
The similarities to Rancière, in particular his concept of police, are clear. Both argue that 
a hegemonic or natural order is one that is continually reproducing itself. Williams even 
goes so far as to deconstruct the determinist relationship between capitalism and the 
superstructure, creating a non-determined theory analogous to Rancière’s. Where 
Williams draws on the traditional vocabulary of Marxism to show this, Rancière instead 
looks for new concepts that highlight the role of the excluded and ignored in the process 
of constructing a stable order. 
 Yet the natural order remains distinct due to Rancière’s openness towards 
numerous spheres of society. Williams, in all his talk of hegemony and counter-
hegemony, treats counter-hegemonic forces as plural, but keeps hegemony as singular. 
Society, despite being free of capitalist determination, has one hegemonic force. There is 
resistance to that force, but there is also no articulation of dominant hegemonies in 
spheres such as the economic, civil, domestic, etc.  
 Laclau and Mouffe’s work on hegemony moves the concept furthest away from 
traditional Marxist usage of hegemony as a form of class domination. This movement 
gives their version of hegemony a number of similarities with Rancière’s natural order, 
and in fact contains much more depth of meaning, as they weave issues of 
subjectification, politics, and police into hegemony. Both Rancière and Laclau and 
Mouffe treat politics and hegemony as contingent, non-determined events that surround 
subjects’ multiple identity positions. Focusing on Laclau and Mouffe’s use of hegemonic 
articulations and their relations to subjects places it on equivalent terms with the natural 
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order. Two differences arise from this limitation. First, where the natural order is the 
result of police practices, hegemony is taken as a form of politics itself. Hegemony is an 
active force for Laclau and Mouffe, whereas the natural order is a passive one. Second, 
Laclau and Mouffe claim that subjects are the product of discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 
2001: 115). It is unclear how or who produces this structuring discourse. Rancière’s focus 
on the agentic capabilities of individuals leads to a questioning of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
assertion that discourses produce subjects. 
 Laclau and Mouffe speak of hegemonies rather than a singular hegemony. 
Hegemonies emerge out of practices of articulation, or practices that attempt to fix 
meanings and alter identities of the hegmonized (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 105). 
Hegemony itself is not based in some privileged position, instead coming from “political 
construction and struggle” (65). Laclau and Mouffe’s hegemony is based on contingent 
articulations and non-privileged field of politics where multiple identities, articulations, 
and antagonisms confront each other and attempt to construct and fix particular meanings 
of subjects. “Hegemony is, quite simply, a political type of relation, a form… of politics; 
but not a determinable location within a topography of the social” (139). The openness of 
Laclau and Mouffe’s hegemony, taken as a whole, places it in a very sympathetic 
position with Rancière’s politics. When comparing hegemony to the natural order, 
however two differences can be seen. 
 First, Rancière treats the natural order as the result of police practices. Police, the 
process of governing subjects without questioning their roles, sets up the system where 
the meanings of subjectivities become relatively fixed (Rancière 2001). Politics and 
police hold the force of hegemonic articulations, so to speak. Police maintains and 
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politics transforms hegemonic articulations or natural orders. For Laclau and Mouffe, it is 
the antagonism between hegemonies that creates and maintains various hegemonic 
articulations. Compared to Rancière, hegemonic articulations are more similar in scope to 
his entire theory of the political.  
 The second difference is on how each theory treats identity. Subjectification is 
“…the production through a series of actions of a body and a capacity for enunciation not 
previously identifiable within a given field of experience, whose identification is thus 
part of the reconfiguration of the field of experience” (Rancière 1999: 35). Rancière 
points to a rift inherent in the subjectification process between the subject as one given in 
the natural order, and the other as “disidentification” with that role in the natural order. 
Where Laclau and Mouffe claim that the subject is the product of a discourse that allows 
for multiple meanings of the subject (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 115), Rancière’s focus on 
the active role of subjects points to subjects and discourses producing each other. 
Rancière questions “the relationship between a who and a what in the apparent 
redundancy of the positing of an existence” (36). 
In politics “woman” is the subject of experience – the denatured, defeminized 
subject – that measures the gap between an acknowledged part (that of sexual 
complimentarity) and a having no part… “[P]roletarian” is similarly the subject 
that measures the gap between the part of work as social function and having no 
part of those who carry it out within the definition of the common of the 
community (Rancière 1999: 36). 
 
One is simultaneously a part (as unequal) in the community, and without part, or lacking 
equality in that community. As such subjectification is not entirely derived from 
discourse in Laclau and Mouffe’s sense. One is shaped by the discourse of 
subjectification (as a worker or member of a specific sex), but at the same time politics 
deconstructs previous structuring discourses of Proletarian/Bourgeoisie, woman/man, 
 72 
citizen/non-citizen. Proletarian itself becomes a term designating the foundational wrong 
of democracy: exclusion (Rancière 1999: 37). 
   
4.2.2 Solidarity and the Natural Order 
 Solidarity and the natural order are both abstract concepts meant to show the 
symbolic underpinnings of group cohesion and social order. However, where Rancière 
considers the natural order a depoliticizing force in society, the Durkheimian usage of 
solidarity points to a more positive, unifying function of this symbolic force. For 
Durkheim, solidarity works to build group cohesion through individuals drawing on the 
same moral values (Durkheim 1984 [1893]: 21). When a society shares the same set of 
sacred and profane codes, and individuals act within the bounds of those codes. There is 
always deviance from these codes, but punishment itself provides society with a re-
unifying ritual reinforcing collective bonds (63). Alexander (2006) takes up the project of 
civil solidarity by tying this form of togetherness in the democratic code of the nation. 
This code, based primarily in the ideas of civil liberty and equality, provides a 
structuring, unifying force in a diverse society. Civil solidarity faces a challenge, 
Alexander writes. It both affects and permeates into other spheres (where solidarity based 
on both liberty and equality is weaker) and must weather challenges from these non-civil 
spheres that do not share the democratic code (Alexander 2006: 194). Alexander remains 
hopeful that civil solidarity eventually affects other spheres in a positive manner because 
the civil sphere is in continual contact with non-civil spheres. The differences and 
cleavages of those spheres must confront the bases of equality and liberty at the heart of 
civil solidarity (194-5). Civil repair, the act of correcting various social wrongs in the 
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civil sphere that affect relations in non-civil spheres, becomes the process of 
universalizing solidarity (207-8).  
 The normative base of Alexander’s theory of civil solidarity and repair is that the 
process is ultimately progressive. Society, he argues, is slowly moving towards a more 
democratic and solidaristic state. However, when one does not assume the natural 
progression of democracy exists, the negative affects of solidarity must be reckoned with, 
especially when solidarity groups from non-civil spheres gain power in the political 
system. Lamont’s (2000) study of working class men in the US and France points to the 
double-edged nature of solidarity. While sharing the same class or racial or national 
identity provided a source of belonging and togetherness, it also created a strong divisive 
boundary between an “us” and “them.” The difference between the constructions of “us” 
and “them” were quite marked, with subjects often times spelling out their distrust and 
dislike of groups that were different. The dangers of particularized solidarities are evident 
in her work, as the strong us-them distinction can easily give rise to racist, xenophobic, or 
class-based political demands that seek to take away the rights or equality of an Other. 
The result of this type of politics is twofold: it attempts to universalize a particular form 
of solidarity as ideal, and it attempts to naturalize it where the Other is no longer equal.  
 Rancière’s democratic paradox shows us that democracy attempts, yet will always 
fail to create an entirely equal democratic system. Each new version of equality masks 
some hidden inequalities and justifies others as natural or given. Civil solidarity as 
Alexander imagines it suffers from the same problems as a white, working class 
solidarity sphere in the US. Both set up systems of what is “there.” The democratic code, 
even though it is a universalizing one, still sets up a field of vision that decides who 
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exists, and how they can exist. This is a natural order, albeit a decent one in its utopian 
state. However, replacing utopian project of equality with one of solidarity as Alexander 
calls for is a dangerous project (Alexander 2006: 549-50). From Durkheim to even 
further back to scholastic theologians, ideal social orders have been described with 
biological metaphors. These descriptions recognize the differences between and 
specializations of individuals, and argue for some ideal construction of these differences 
into a harmonious whole. The problem with descriptions of solidarity systems is that they 
predetermine the existing parts and roles individuals can have in a society. In other 
words, these systems attempt to create a natural order that depoliticizes through justifying 
or ignoring inequalities. 
 Rancière would likely question whether the civil sphere, based in the codes of 
equality, could even coexist with non-civil spheres driven by segmentation and 
inequality. The economic sphere, for example, precludes most workers from having 
equality with economic elites. These workers, supposedly, are granted equality with elites 
in the civil sphere, where every voice is heard. But at this point we return to the problem 
of the miscount – the workers’ (or the demos’) political equality is a miscount compared 
to the rights and equality of the oligoï. Inequality in non-civil spheres makes the 
democratic miscount possible. Political equality is no equality at all, and any solidarity 
built upon civil equality is one built upon miscounting the parts of society. 
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4.3 Contradictions in the Natural Order: Towards a Political Moment 
The natural order, despite its depoliticizing tendencies, does not prevent political 
moments from happening that challenge the conceptualization of who can be equal and 
what is “there.” These moments happen, and the natural order is disrupted because of the 
miscount that is at the foundation of democratic society. There is no question over 
whether or not an excluded other exists. The real question is how and when some 
excluded subjectivity makes the demand for inclusion. The Seneca Falls Convention in 
1848 was one example of an excluded subjectivity demanding equality. For this 
convention to occur, though, a break from the natural order was needed, one that led 
women to challenge their place in various spheres of life. These breaks did not come 
from some radical outside position though. The natural orders in which the women lived 
provided the space for them to challenge their own places and roles. In particular, the 
interrelated spheres of politics and civil society, religion, and the legal sphere each 
opened up space from which the political moment at Seneca Falls could be possible.  
 
4.3.1 Religion and Conflicting Boundaries of Equality 
In the writings and transcribed speeches of feminists like Lucretia Mott and Sarah 
Grimké, belief in the spiritual equality of men and women under God drove efforts to 
equalize gender relations in society. Based largely in Quaker religious beliefs, this 
particular spiritual mediation of the sexes challenged other Christian understandings of 
gender roles and equality in both religious and civil spheres. Bartlett (1988) argues that 
three factors of Quakerism were important to see the relationship between Quakerism and 
women’s equality. The first was the doctrine of “inner light,” or the belief that all people 
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should act based in an inner moral conscience that comes from God. Since God bestows 
this equally on men and women, the result is the belief that both sexes are morally equal 
(Bartlett 1988: 9-10). Second, in marriage a husband and wife were to be “spiritually 
equal” (10). This spiritual equality translated to the material world through a more 
(though not entirely) equal distribution of household labor (Bartlett 1988: 10; Hewitt 
1986). Finally, Quakerism gave women roles in the church as ministers and 
administrators, meaning women had the ability to preach and make decisions regarding 
the functioning of the church. (Bartlett 1988: 10). Though these three factors did not 
make women entirely equal to men in the Quaker religious sphere, their position relative 
to men was much closer to equal than other religions where women were excluded from 
preaching and managing the church, and relegated to an unequal member of the 
household. The boundaries between gender roles in Quaker and non-Quaker religions 
provided a contradictory space for Quaker women to take a larger stage to call for 
women’s equality as a spiritual right. 
Sarah Grimké’s Letters on the Equality of the Sexes, originally published together 
in 1838, provides perhaps the clearest example of how religious codes of equality were 
used to promote women’s rights. Grimké’s Letters, published ten years before Seneca 
Falls, provided an influential text for moral arguments for equality. Grimké’s Quakerism 
stressed the importance of moral equality, the spiritual equality of husband and wife, and 
the belief women should have a voice in the functioning of the church, with the Hicksite 
sect of Quakerism taking a more democratic approach to the role of women in the church 
(Bartlett 1988: 10-11). Sarah Grimké and her sister Angelina were some of the first 
female abolitionists to speak in public in New England in the 1830s. Sarah’s Letters were 
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responses, based in Biblical exegesis, to the question of whether or not women should be 
taking up this role as political actor (1-2). In a letter from July 1837, Grimké argued that 
women should take up the cause of “public salvation,” claiming that it is not “unnatural” 
but “…in exact accordance with the will of Him” (Grimké 1988: 41). Grimké’s 
justification for public speaking in the abolition movement comes from the scriptural 
belief in the equality of men and women, and that it is women’s duty to follow the will of 
God, which in the case of abolition meant speaking and acting in public so to end slavery.  
Grimké based her argument through Biblical interpretations that claimed God 
created man and woman in his image as equals. Basing the claim for equality in the story 
of the origins of humans, Grimké shows that the fundamental relationship between men 
and women is one of equals. Drawing on the book of Genesis, Grimké quotes: “So God 
created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him, male and female 
created he them” (Gen. 1:26-7; in Grimké 1988a: 32). Grimké follows this with the claim 
for equality: 
In all this sublime description of the creation of man (which is a generic term 
including man and woman), there is not one particle of difference intimated as 
existing between them. They were both made in the image of God; dominion was 
given to both over every other creature, but not over each other. Created in perfect 
equality, they were expected to exercise the vicegerence intrusted [sic] to them by 
their Maker, in harmony and love (Grimké 1988a: 32) (ellipses in original). 
 
Equality, in the religious sphere, is a naturally given right coming from God. Whether or 
not this is an accurate reading of the Bible is irrelevant. What matters is that Grimké and 
other women were drawing on sacred religious codes in order to argue for their equality 
in the religious sphere. This moment of politics in the religious sphere was a disruption of 
the general Protestant one that unquestioningly placed women in secondary position to 
men. 
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Lucretia Mott also drew on her Quaker beliefs to make the claim that women are 
equal to men. In a sermon delivered in 1841, Mott argued that men and women were in 
fact spiritual equals and both had the right to preach: 
Was it not one of the first acts of the apostles, to announce, in the words of the 
prophet Joel, that the spirit of the Lord was poured out upon all flesh; -- and was 
this not quoted to convince the people, that prophesying and preaching of both 
sexes was in fulfillment of ancient prophecy? (Mott 1980a: 27-8). 
 
From there Mott attacked those who use the Bible to deny women a voice in the church. 
Mott, claiming she can “find no such passage” that places women as silent members of 
the church, called on women to fight for equality in the church (28). 
…[W]hat a different and nobler generation should we behold in the next … if the 
high duties of women were all fulfilled! I believe the tendency of truth, on this 
subject, is to equalize the sexes; and that, when truth directs us, there will be no 
longer assumed authority on one side or admitted inferiority on the other; but that 
as we advance in the cultivation of all our powers, physical as well as intellectual 
and moral, we shall see that our independence is equal, our dependence mutual, 
and our obligations reciprocal (Mott 1980a: 28-9). 
 
Mott’s sermon, focused here on religious equality, shows that an already-present political 
demand for women’s equality existed in the religious sphere. The natural order of the 
religious sphere was already in some state of contestation, with Quaker women 
challenging the place of women in the larger Christian religious sphere.  
 The writings and speeches of the Grimké sisters and Lucretia Mott proved to be 
challenges against the given, unequal religious natural order. These challenges showed 
the underlying forms of exclusion that has been built into most sects of Christianity. 
Their writings and speeches also show that solidarity in the Christian religious sphere has 
been based in women’s subjugation to men. Religion provides a sense of belonging in its 
community, but it has long done so through a demarcation of unequal parts based in sex 
and gender differences. Grimké and Mott’s challenge to the traditional religious natural 
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order meant to replace it with one where equality of the sexes was the foundation of the 
new natural order.  
 
4.3.2 Civil Codes: Democratic Ideals and Lived Experiences 
The same religious beliefs that placed men and women as spiritual equals also led 
Quakers and other Protestant groups to claim that whites and blacks were also spiritually 
equal. For both the Grimké sisters and Lucretia Mott, their involvement in the abolition 
movement came form the same religious codes of equality. However, their political 
actions in this sphere drew as much on civil codes of equality as religious. Civil codes of 
equality follow the tradition of Enlightenment philosophy and its political applications 
that individuals are endowed with natural rights like freedom and equality. Yet the state 
of women in the civil and political sphere was not based in freedom or equality. Women 
were part of a separate sphere outside the realm of politics, deemed unfit for the impure 
world of politics and the public sphere (Ryan 1992; Isenberg 1998; Norton 2011). The 
natural order of the civil sphere was one where women were precluded from being full 
citizens, or members of a political and civil community of equals. Civil codes of equality, 
present in abolition debates at the time, are most clear in the eponymous document of the 
Seneca Falls Convention – the Declaration of Sentiments. This document, rephrased from 
the Declaration of Independence, makes the demand of absolute equality largely from the 
base of republican tradition of natural rights in governance. Before that political moment 
happened, however, the women who organized and participated in the Seneca Falls 
Convention were active in another political movement – abolitionism. While fighting for 
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equality and rights for another excluded group, these women began to look at their own 
condition of exclusion relative to white men.  
Based in the same codes of equality, abolitionism was an ongoing movement that 
was challenging the “natural order” of relations between whites and African Americans.  
Abolitionism provided one of the first venues for women’s groups to enter into the public 
sphere (McMillan 2008). The abolition movement could lead to this break not only 
through democratic codes themselves, but also from the segmented private and public 
spheres women in the movement inhabited. Jacobs (2000) argues that due to racism and 
exclusion from white America, African Americans in the US developed an alternative 
public sphere from which to build new narratives and strategies to fight discrimination. 
This segmented sphere worked as the space for Rancière’s politics. Their demands for 
equality were constructed in a similar public sphere, but one that disrupted the natural 
order that excluded African Americans from full membership in the political and civil 
community of equals. For women involved in progressive religious societies in the 1830s 
and 1840s, their separate sphere provided them space to enter into the abolition debates, 
and eventually demand equality for women.  
Women-based anti-slavery societies provided segmented access to the civil sphere 
for bourgeois women in the early- to mid-nineteenth century. Based in the style of 
previous benevolent societies – local women’s organizations geared towards community 
service – women found space to address a larger political issue than the typical mundane 
issues benevolent societies addressed (Isenberg 1998: 59-61). Women’s increasing 
participation in the abolition movement, especially in the northeast, was also aided by 
William Lloyd Garrison’s efforts to target these benevolent societies to support the 
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abolition movement. Garrison was a figurehead of the abolition movement, helping to 
establish the journal Liberator and the Anti-Slavery Society. Through aligning himself 
with emerging women’s religious-based abolition groups, Garrison tapped into women’s 
religious organizations as a way to further his own version of abolitionist politics 
(Marilley 1996: 43; Wellman 2004: 48-9, 54-5).11 Of particular note, in 1835 Garrison 
published a private letter sent to him by Angelina Grimké in his abolition journal, 
Liberator. This letter changed the Grimké sisters’ role in the movement, from relatively 
new members to active speakers and leaders (Wellman 2004: 49). The sisters began 
giving public speeches in 1836, at first only to women but later to mixed audiences. No 
matter Garrison’s intentions in publishing Grimké’s letter and general support of female 
abolition societies, the result was a shift for many women from private sphere 
participation to a public sphere discussing matters of equality. In 1840, the Garrison-led 
Anti-Slavery Society appointed the first woman, Abigail Kelly, to the business committee 
of the society (Gordon 1997: 26-7 n. 7). Women were able to take part as equals in the 
Anti-Slavery Society, allowing women the opportunity to act as full members of the civil 
and political sphere.  
When women did speak publicly on abolitionism, however, the public reaction 
was mixed, and often critical. In a public letter sent by the Philadelphia Anti-Slavery 
Society, a women’s abolition group, they asked their members and sympathizers to attend 
a forthcoming public speech by Sarah Grimké. Noting the hardships Grimké will face for 
speaking in public, they ask: 
                                                
11 Marilley (1996) notes that though Garrison relied on women’s religious groups to fill the ranks of his 
cause, he would not use scriptural reasoning to argue for the abolition of slavery, claiming that those 
opposing him the most were fundamentalists. Instead Garrison drew entirely on reasoning based in liberal 
thought (60). 
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She must encounter not only the sneers of the heartless multitude, which are the 
portion of every faithful abolitionist, but grave charges of infractions of the laws 
of female delicacy and propriety… While, then, our sister is willing to dedicate 
herself to this arduous part of the work, and for Christ’s sake and the gospel’s, 
welcomes the keen reproach and bitter contempt incident to it, we entreat you to 
give her your support, your sympathy, and your prayers (Philadelphia Anti-
Slavery Society 2002: 36). 
 
Public participation in the abolition movement itself was a moment of politics in terms of 
women’s equality. Their presence in the civil sphere was a rejection of the natural order 
of republican motherhood, which placed women solely in the private sphere (Ryan 1992; 
Norton 2011). Though this interruption was not aimed at achieving women’s equality, it 
can be viewed in the larger picture as an act that helped normalize women’s presence in 
politics and the civil sphere.  
 Abolitionism not only provided the symbolic resources that helped the Seneca 
Falls convention emerge, it also created ties among women in the northeast US. The 
barring of women from participating in the World Convention on Slavery in London in 
1840 provided a moment that brought Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott together 
(Stanton 1993 [1898]; McMillan 2008). At the Convention in London, women traveled 
from America expecting to participate in the proceedings, only to find that the British 
organizers refused to allow women to participate. In her memoirs, Stanton recalled the 
harsh lesson she and her colleagues learnt on the trip: 
To me there was no question so important as the emancipation of women from the 
dogmas of the past, political, religious and social. It struck me as very remarkable 
that abolitionists… should be so oblivious to the equal wrongs of their own 
mothers, wives, and sisters… (Stanton 1993 [1898]: 79).  
 
 The shared experience of exclusion raised the question of the role of women for both 
Stanton and Mott, as their own unequal status was made explicit surrounding the question 
of the status of slaves (McMillan 2008; Wellman 1991). With women engaging in 
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debates and actions on abolition, the question of the place of women in society continued 
to be raised, as both groups were denied the full rights of citizenship to varying degrees. 
Though the abolition movement did provide women with various social and cultural 
capitals needed to further the cause of women’s rights (Bartlett 1988; Marilley 1996; 
Wellman 2004), this chapter’s concern with the Seneca Falls Convention’s interruption 
into the police with the demand of equality (Rancière 1999: 30) makes symbolic concerns 
more salient. Women were organizing, speaking, and acting in the abolition movement, 
and seeing how their own position related to the same discourse.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 The natural order is a minor concept of Rancière’s, but in the movement from 
philosophy to sociological theory, it becomes a necessary part of the theory in order to 
understand how political moments can arise. Its importance lies in the fact that it is the 
result of efforts to depoliticize, demarcate certain inequalities as natural, or that it 
attempts to ignore the existence of other inequalities. From differing sociological 
viewpoints, this stability can be seen as hegemonic or solidaristic social formations. 
However, the natural order consisting of multiple orders broadens it from hegemony, and 
the ineluctable relationship between democracy and inequality makes it critical of 
solidarity as a utopian endpoint. Natural orders mask and justify inequalities, and as such 
cannot be taken as an ideal state or system. 
 In the religious and civil spheres examined in this chapter the established natural 
orders were in clear view. In the religious sphere, Biblical interpretations of gender roles 
were used to create and justify both the exclusion and inclusion of women as equals 
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depending on the sect. In the civil sphere, the supposed purity of women and impurity of 
politics and the world outside the household were justifications for keeping women out of 
politics and the civil sphere. These natural orders, though largely effective in maintaining 
their respective systems of inequality, did not prevent the political moment at Seneca 
Falls from happening. This is due to the fact that the natural order attempts to mask 
inequalities or justify them as natural. Lived experience and cultural codes of equality 
together challenge the masking and justifying of inequalities. 
 In terms of gender equality, where the general Christian-based religious natural 
order was already facing challenge from Hicksite Quakerism, the civil sphere’s natural 
order was about to face serious challenge due to the dissonance between the democratic 
code of equality and the lived experience of inequality women faced. Women’s 
involvement in abolitionism and property reform in the 1830s and 40s only made this 
disconnect more apparent, as well as challenge old justifications of women being 
unsuited for the impurity of politics. It was the combination of their own lived 
experiences as unequal yet active in politics, as well as their engagement of religious and 
civil codes of equality that help produce a new political moment. The Seneca Falls 
Convention emerged as an attempt to replace the unequal natural orders of the civil and 
religious spheres with ones that included women as equals.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE MOMENT OF INTERRUPTION: POLITICS AT SENECA FALLS 
5.1 Introduction 
 Though not the first,12 nor even perhaps the most influential,13 the Seneca Falls 
Convention can be clearly conceived as an instance of Rancière’s politics, and therefore a 
version of the Politics of Equals. As argued in chapter two, the Politics of Equals is a 
limited yet radical understanding of politics as a non-determined moment that attempts to 
reshape the placement of excluded subjectivities in society. The convention at Seneca 
Falls gave voice to a number of avenues of exclusion women faced in their lives. The 
convention most notably gained renown for the document produced, “The Declaration of 
Sentiments.”14 Copying the model of Jefferson’s “Declaration of Independence,” the 
Declaration of Sentiments tied women’s inequality to an injustice against their natural 
and political rights as human beings. Women were remaking their subjectivity from one 
that precluded them as political and civil equals to one that was based in gender equality. 
In doing so, the question of equality became central to all spheres of life the women were 
part of – civil and non-civil. 
 In their attempt to disrupt the symbolic place of women in US society, the 
convention can be clearly viewed as an instance of the Politics of Equals. Based on their 
previous experiences of exclusion, their involvement in the abolition movement, Hicksite 
Quakerism, and the struggle for property rights, the women at the convention could 
                                                
12 Mary Wollstonecraft, the Grimké sisters, and Margaret Fuller (1980 [1845]) all had made similar 
interruptions previously or near the same time. 
13 Hewitt (1986) and Isenberg (1998) both argue that other conventions were more influential for the 
growth of the movement – Rochester in 1848, and Salem, OH in 1850, respectively. However, both agree 
that Seneca Falls was still a major Convention in its own right. 
14 Also known as “The Declaration of Rights and Sentiments.” 
 86 
clearly articulate: (1) how they were excluded (or in Rancière’s terms, a part without a 
part), and (2) how and why they deserved to be equal to men in civil and non-civil 
spheres (or why they deserved entrance into Rancière’s community of equals).  
 The method in which they made these demands, however, may not be as radical 
as Rancière imagined interruptions to be. In fact, the process clearly is analogous to 
sociological works on civil repair (Alexander 2006), cultural repertoires (Steinberg 1999; 
Lamont and Thévenot 2000) and symbolic boundaries (Lamont 2000; Lamont and 
Fournier 1992). Codes of liberty and equality are at the base of the democratic civil 
sphere. Political movements discursively draw on these codes in their demands, 
attempting to liken themselves or their cause to the sacred underpinnings of civil life. 
While the focus of works in this tradition has been the civil sphere, the same process can 
be said of action in non-civil spheres as well. Each sphere has its own system of codes, 
values and placement of people or institutions in regards to them. It follows then that 
political demands made of non-civil spheres are similar.15 Drawing on democratic codes 
of equality as well as Biblical interpretations that denied essential differences between 
men and women, the convention utilized existing cultural codes in civil and non-civil 
spheres as a means to gain equality.  
 Lamont and Molnár (2002) define symbolic boundaries as “tools by which 
individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality” (168). 
These boundaries can be over mundane aspects of life such as one’s tastes or over 
existential markers of inclusion and exclusion into civil, political, and economic life. At 
                                                
15 This generalizing statement does bring up the question of politics emerging in non-civil spheres yet 
being debated and acted upon in the civil sphere. In this case, Alexander (2006) argues that codes from 
each sphere attempt to permeate the other, and complimentary codes between spheres are the base from 
which disputes are resolved (266-8; 404-5).  
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this broader level, distinction between included and excluded takes on greater symbolic 
weight, as those falling outside the markers of the boundary embody some degree of the 
profane that prevents them from being a member of that community. Rancière’s 
community of equals works at this macro level of a subjectivities’ relation to particular 
communities. For women at the convention, their noted placement as outsiders in gender, 
religious, economic, civil, and political boundaries was motivation for calls of equality. 
Their placement outside the community of equals in political, civil, and non-civil life was 
unjust. A symbolic shift in the role of women in society was needed.  
 The Declaration of Sentiments is worthy of detailed examination because it 
details how the Convention was part of the Politics of Equals. First, the language in the 
document clearly and effectively links the demands for equality with sacred codes of the 
nation, codes that structure our political and social life (Alexander 2006: 57-9). Second, 
the document is political through the way it “plays” with the Declaration of Independence 
to redefine who can be an equal (Sewell 1999: 51). This “playing” can both reshape 
meanings of the original cultural object (Declaration of Independence) or help shape the 
meaning of the new one (Declaration of Sentiments) (Schudson 1989). The result was a 
document that attempted to place women inside the boundaries of “equals,” or in 
Rancière's language, to become members of the community of equals. The document also 
highlights one paradox found in the struggle for equality, that equality itself can have 
varied meanings, and that these meanings can at times conflict with other codes of the 
civil sphere. In other words, being “equal” in a hierarchical structure like capitalism can 
have two meanings – equal with everyone in terms of their role to labor and capital, or 
equal as able to fully enter the same system of inequality that others already are part. 
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5.2 The Interruption 
 Though Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott had discussed holding a 
convention on women’s rights after their exclusion from participating at the World Anti-
Slavery Convention in 1840, only in 1848 did concrete plans emerge (Stanton 1993 
[1898]: 83; 147-8). As Stanton recalled, it was in discussion with Lucretia Mott and 
others in Waterloo, NY that led to the concrete plans for the convention (Stanton, 
Anthony and Gage 1889). A call for the convention was printed in the Seneca County 
Courier on 14 July 1848, calling for the convention in Seneca Falls for 19-20 July 1848 
(Wellman 2004: 276 n. 16). In a letter to Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucretia Mott 
described her hopes for the convention: “…[I]t will be a beginning and we may hope it 
will be followed in due time by one of a more general character” (Mott 2002: 163). 
Despite this short notice, the convention had 83 women sign their names to the document. 
No written accounts of the entire convention remain; however what is most important 
about the convention is the Declaration of Sentiments. The eleven resolutions adopted 
and numerous claims on the unjust position of women in society clearly and succinctly 
demonstrate women’s exclusion, how it has been turned into a naturalized difference 
compared to men, and an instance of Rancière’s politics, where an excluded subjectivity 
demands membership to the community of equals. While the majority of the demands 
centered on the political and civil spheres, a number of resolutions demanded equality in 
non-civil spheres such as religion, work, family, and education. These will be examined 
here in order to show the radical demands presented, how equality in one sphere is 
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intertwined with equality in others, how codes of equality can sometimes conflict with 
codes of liberty, and how codes of equality tied these demands together. 
 
5.2.1 Political and Civil Equality 
 Mimicking Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, as 
main author of the Declaration of Sentiments, starkly shows the inequality between men 
and women in the civil sphere: 
The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the 
part of man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an 
absolute tyranny over her. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world. 
 
He has never permitted her to exercise her inalienable right to the elective 
franchise. 
 
He has compelled her to submit to laws, in the formation of which she had no 
voice. 
 
He has withheld from her rights which are given to the most ignorant and 
degraded men – both natives and foreigners. 
 
Having deprived her of this first right of a citizen, the elective franchise, thereby 
leaving her without representation in the halls of legislation, he has oppressed her 
on all sides (Declaration of Rights and Sentiments: 238). 
 
In these statements, the Declaration argues a number of points. First, it argues that 
women do not have any semblance of equality in politics or as citizens. Theirs is a 
complete exclusion, placing them without a part in functioning of democratic politics. 
The question becomes, in Rancière’s language, whether women can exist in the counting 
and distribution of parts, and providing a new logic that includes women in this process. 
The state of politics, where women are denied the right to vote and have no say in the 
laws she must submit to, is one where its logic is formulated without women. Women as 
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a subject were not supposed to be a part of this political logic. This idea had roots since 
colonial times – women’s moral qualities and position as wives, mothers, and daughters 
made them unfit for the “impurity” of politics (Kerber 1980; Gurko 1976: 28; Isenberg 
1998: 43-5; Ryan 1992; Norton 1980, 2011; Bloch 2003)16. For women to challenge their 
position meant countering this with a new political logic, or “…an opposition of logics 
that count the parties and parts of the community in different ways” (Rancière 2001: 
6:19). In the language of cultural sociology, the women argue that there is a disconnect 
between their lived experience as citizens and the sacred codes of the nation based in 
equality. 
 Second, in creating this opposing political logic, women (re-)create themselves as 
a subjectivity that has inalienable rights that are equal to the rights of men. While 
seemingly a minor point, for Rancière this becomes a central feature of his philosophy. 
Rancière has built his work around the belief that no one subjectivity or group can claim 
mastery over another, be they workers (Rancière 2012 [1989]), teachers (Rancière 1991), 
or citizens (Rancière 1999). The process of attaining equality begins with acting “as-if” 
the excluded subjectivity is in fact equal (Schaap 2011). By asserting the right to vote as 
inalienable, the authors of the Declaration are acting “as-if” this right to political equality 
already exists. It is from this base that the excluded can achieve equality. This acting is 
evident in their demand for suffrage: 
Resolved, That it is the duty of the women of this country to secure to themselves 
their sacred right to the elective franchise (Declaration of Rights and Sentiments: 
240). 
 
                                                
16 Hewitt (1986) argues that notions of separate spheres for women were found largely in urban settings, 
and the experiences of rural, and especially rural Quaker women, were different. 
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 The resolutions in the Declaration build upon the recognition of oppression and 
demand the equality that is their natural right. These resolutions are the interruption 
Rancière speaks of, as they are, “…a significant interruption of the assumptions and 
logics of subjects’ parts and roles in a society” (Connor and Baiocchi 2011: 9). This 
break was based in the idea of natural rights of people and their equal treatment under the 
law, ideas based in Enlightenment philosophy (Bartlett 1988; Marilley 1996; Blackstone 
1979 [1841]) and a sacred code of the democratic system (Alexander and Smith 1993). 
Like the abolition movement, women’s rights emerged with the belief in natural rights of 
women and men. 
Resolved, That all laws which prevent woman from occupying such a station in 
society as her conscience shall dictate, or which place her in a position inferior to 
that of man, are contrary to the great precept of nature, and therefore of no force 
or authority (Declaration of Rights and Sentiments: 240). 
 
Like Enlightenment philosophers before, tying gender equality to natural rights 
intertwined the non-civil religious sphere with the civil sphere. Political equality in any 
form could not be imagined without this. The women at Seneca Falls note this in their 
resolution: 
…That woman is man’s equal – was intended to be so by the Creator, and the 
highest good of the race demands that she should be recognized as such” 
(Declaration of Rights and Sentiments: 240). 
 
The linking of civil and religious codes was the basis for their initial support. As Hewitt 
(1986) argues, the women attending the Seneca Falls Convention, as well as the 
convention in Rochester in August 1848, were largely rural, Quaker women’s lives were 
less segregated from men compared to their urban counterparts (Hewitt 1986: 29). The tie 
between civil and religious codes in the US was, and is, an enduring feature of political 
life in the US (Connolly 2008). As numerous works in the social sciences have argued 
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(Wood 2002; Lichterman 2005; Mahmood 2005; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Hansen 1999; 
Williams 1999), the ties between organized religion and the civil sphere are constant and 
strong in democracy throughout the world. Drawing back on the earlier discussion of 
Quaker interpretations of gender roles in society, these initial claims of equality, at least 
from a Quaker standpoint, showed that the religious-sacred code of equality was the same 
as the national-sacred code. Simply put, women’s equality inexorably linked the civil and 
Quaker religious spheres, where equality was a natural right in both. 
 
5.2.2 Religious Equality 
 Religious codes are commonly found in social movements in the US, from major 
movements like civil rights (McAdam 1982: 48-9) to more mundane ones affecting local 
neighborhoods and communities (Wood 2002; Lichterman 2005). Religion, especially 
versions were women were already relatively equal to men, provided a space for religious 
codes to enter into the question of women’s equality. Hicksite Quakerism, as previously 
noted, held men and women as equals under God’s eyes. As such, Hicksite Quaker 
women had a larger active presence in religious practice and administration compared to 
other Protestant sects (Bartlett 1988). Their claim for religious equality, however, did not 
go unchallenged. Within the Quaker community and other Protestant sects, gender 
difference and female subordination, was argued to come from the Bible (Bartlett 1988; 
Greene 1980). The struggle in the religious sphere for equality needed to address the fact 
that in most other Christian sects, women were precluded from if not spiritual equality 
under God, then material equality centering on the roles of women in the everyday 
functioning of the church: 
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He allows her in Church as well as State, but a subordinate position, claiming 
Apostolic authority for her exclusion from the ministry, and, with some 
exceptions, from any public participation in the affairs of the Church (Declaration 
of Rights and Sentiments: 239). 
 
The religious interruption at Seneca Falls centered on this debate. Women had a right to 
be equal as speakers and members of a Church because the right of equality came from 
God. Equality for them was a sacred religious right, and the Convention became a means 
to re-assert this.  
Resolved, That woman has too long rested satisfied in the circumscribed limits 
which corrupt customs and a perverted application of the Scriptures have marked 
out for her, and that it is time she should move in the enlarged sphere which her 
great Creator has assigned her (Declaration of Rights and Sentiments: 240). 
 
Equality was demanded in the same way political equality was. The difference, however, 
was the basis from which the demand was made. Instead of using liberal philosophical 
codes, equality in religion comes strictly from religious codes. These codes of equality 
function very much in the same manner as codes of the civil sphere, and in effect the 
result leads to similar demands of equality: 
Resolved, therefore, That, being invested by the Creator with the same 
capabilities, and the same consciousness of responsibility for their exercise, it is 
demonstrably the right and duty of woman, equally with man, to promote every 
righteous cause… [A]nd especially in regard to… morals and religion, it is self-
evidently her right to participate with her brother in teaching them, both in private 
and in public, by writing and speaking… and in any assemblies proper to be 
held… (Declaration of Rights and Sentiments: 240-41) 
 
The right of equality in religion here goes beyond basic religion and into general roles 
and behaviors expected of women. Because women’s equality is a God-given right, they 
argue, it means that they must be allowed to behave like men in the exercise and teach 
religion in the same manner, “both in private and in public.” By linking religious 
teachings to a generalized public sphere, the women at Seneca Falls rejected traditional 
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republican norms that placed women under a different set of morality and bound to a 
separate sphere. Practically, this meant the linking of two (not always separate) groups of 
women that made up the base of those who signed the Declaration – abolitionists and 
Quakers (Wellman 1991: 24). Because the same code was present in the two spheres 
(though with differing origins), it effectively shaped the interruption to bridge the civil 
and religious spheres, leading to a larger claim for equality.  
   
5.2.3 Conflicting Codes: Labor and Equality 
 The economic sphere presents a challenge to any conceptualization of equality, 
and shows how codes of equality can conflict with ones of liberty. Specifically, a 
capitalist economic sphere questions the claims of a non-stratified society by drawing on 
codes of liberty in economic settings. A political interruption in this sphere, because it 
disrupts the basis of relationships between parts, disrupts the capitalist order of classes. In 
other words, politics in this sphere would resemble some form of communism. This 
radical break puts a limit on how far economic politics can bring about equality. After all, 
the civil sphere is built upon codes of liberty as well as equality. Inequalities in non-civil 
spheres can be seen as natural results of individual action and effort. If women demand 
equality in the economic sphere, is it politics? 
  Though Stanton and Lucretia Mott focused much less on the topic in their 
collected writings and memoirs, equality in labor surfaced at the convention.17 The 
women note the second-class status women faced in regards to work: 
                                                
17 In collected copies of letters and speeches (Greene 1980; Palmer 2002; Gordon 1997; Stanton 1993 
[1898]), issues surrounding labor and equality are scant. 
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He has monopolized nearly all the profitable employments, and from those she is 
permitted to follow, she receives but a scanty remuneration. 
 
He closes against her all the avenues to wealth and distinction, which he considers 
most honorable to himself… (Declaration of Rights and Sentiments: 238). 
 
The demand is simple – women should have the same rights in the sphere of labor as 
men, “…even to the wages she earns” (Declaration of Rights and Sentiments: 238). 
However, the question of equality in the sphere of work has two meanings. In one sense, 
the demand for equality is to be the same as men in a capitalist economy, or to have the 
same rights to own business, work as a wage, laborer, or any other working condition 
men faced. While women were not completely excluded from the workforce, their 
position was secondary. In the other sense, equality has a more radical meaning, one that 
dismantles distinctions between owners and workers. The two meanings of equality have 
completely different trajectories – where one allows for the equal entrance into the 
capitalist field, the other attempts to dismantle that field as an unjust method of 
distributing subjects and resources in society. Rancière refers to the two meanings of 
equality when he states: “A choice must be made between being equal in an unequal 
society and being unequal in an ‘equal’ society, a society which transforms equality into 
its opposite” (Rancière 1995: 84). The demands made at Seneca Falls fall into the former 
category; a more radical demand would attempt the latter. The demand to gain work and 
profit, from this standpoint at least, places women in the same tiered capitalist system that 
men currently were part of. Though Rancière treats a fully egalitarian society as utopian 
(83-4), a demand for this type of equality would be one that attempts to dismantle the 
capitalist economic order. While not necessarily “police,” economic equality at Seneca 
Falls was not a radical version.  
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 Herein lie the conflicting codes faced in the calls for economic reform, between 
concerns for equality among workers, and those of liberty that stress the importance of 
the freedom in the economic sphere. The “value regimes” (Alexander 2006: 229) of the 
civil and economic spheres differ, leading to limitations on the type and amount of 
equality that can translate from the civil sphere to the economic one. At the same time, 
this also limits the structured inequalities of capitalism from structuring inequality in the 
civil and other non-civil spheres. Each sphere’s natural order provides it with relative 
autonomy from other spheres, with the borders of the community of equals smaller or 
larger in each one. The limited community of equals in the capitalist economic sphere can 
conflict with, but remain stable compared to a much more broad community of equals in 
the civil sphere.  
 
5.2.4 Legal Equality 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the affects of an unequal legal system on 
women, and the efforts to change that system, were salient factors for the women at 
Seneca Falls to demand equality. The fact that many of the demands in the Declaration 
deal with legal equality should then come as no surprise. Generally tied to unequal 
domestic relations between a husband and wife, these demands sought the end of men 
making married women “civilly dead” (Declaration of Rights and Sentiments: 238).  
…In the covenant of marriage, she is compelled to promise obedience to her 
husband, he becoming, to all intents and purposes, her master – the law giving 
him power to deprive her of her liberty, and to administer chastisement” 
(Declaration of Rights and Sentiments: 238). 
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Marriage, in their view, was an institution of oppression where women lost their freedom 
to their husband. Husbands were the public face of marriage, and represented both 
husband and wife in regards to public and political life. One result was that when the 
husband died, the wife was more or less “dead” in the legal sense. She could not inherit 
the property she shared with her husband and became dependent on her children or other 
family members as a widow.  
 Family law was a problem beyond inheritance. Divorce was another concern for 
the women at the convention: 
He has so framed the laws of divorce, as to what shall be the proper causes of 
divorce; in case of separation, to whom the guardianship of the children shall be 
given; as to be wholly regardless of the happiness of women – the law, in all 
cases, going upon the false supposition of the supremacy of man, and giving all 
power into his hands (Declaration of Rights and Sentiments: 238). 
 
The patriarchal legal system, they argue, denies women the right to leave a marriage or 
gain custody of children on their terms – women must always submit to an unjust, 
unequal system of law. Equality here cannot be granted merely through legal reform; it 
comes from allowing women to be able to create and shape laws to the same degree as 
men. This is the essence of Rancière’s “active equality” (May 2008). When equality is 
not earned, or given from a master (Rancière 1991), it is granted by others. The risk of 
this is that equality can be taken away as easily as it is earned. Equality here cannot occur 
merely through gaining a change in divorce and custody laws where men make the 
decisions. Equality will only occur actively, where women achieve a place where they 
make the laws as well. 
 Of course, equality in regards to the law relates to enforcement as well as 
creation. The Declaration also tackles this aspect of legal equality: 
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Resolved, That the same amount of virtue, delicacy, and refinement of behavior, 
that is required of women in the social state, should also be required of man, and 
the same transgressions should be visited with equal severity on both man and 
woman (Declaration of Rights and Sentiments: 240). 
 
Under common law in the 19th century, married women were treated as “covered” by 
their husband, where the husband assumes the legal existence of his spouse (McMillen 
2008: 19). In essence, a married woman had no legal rights, as they became her 
husband’s rights. The construction and application of laws completely excluded married 
women from any community of equals. For legal change to become politics, it must 
attempt to alter the legal system so that married women become legally existing citizens, 
where the law applies to them in the same manner as men. These demands in the 
Declaration centering on legal change, from property rights to rights of citizenship in 
marriage, attempt to remake women’s standing as equals under the law. 
 
5.3 After the Convention: From Interruption to Equality 
 The Seneca Falls Convention clearly was a moment of interruption, or politics. 
However, this sociological reconstruction of Rancière opens up politics to the post-
interruption. How does a political interruption, which is a single, ephemeral moment, lead 
to a real change in the community of equals? Though this project as a whole has been 
concerned with documenting the emergence and moments of politics, this chapter will 
close with a brief discussion of what happens after the interruption. The Seneca Falls 
Convention did not lead to any immediate changes in the state of women in the civil and 
non-civil spheres of society. But it was part of the beginning of a concentrated movement 
towards equality. A brief examination of the rise of Women’s Rights Conventions shows 
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that starting from three weeks after Seneca Falls, more women wanted to meet and 
discuss their unequal position in society, and often asked Elizabeth Cady Stanton and 
Lucretia Mott to speak at these events. From 1848 to approximately the start of the Civil 
War, the question of women’s equality became an important question in the civil sphere. 
After the war and with the passage of the 15th amendment the movement narrowed its 
goals towards suffrage, culminating in the achievement of suffrage. Though not full 
political or civil equality, suffrage did create a more equal civil sphere. 
 News of the Convention and the Declaration spread quickly, discussed in 
newspapers and journals (Gurko 1976: 103-4). Though Elizabeth Cady Stanton recalled 
much of these article critiquing the event and ridiculing women (Stanton 1993 [1898]: 
149), contemporary scholars have found these claims to be exaggerated and that there 
were many supportive articles as well (Wellman 2004: 210). Scholars of the civil sphere 
argue that the media is a central feature of linking political issues and problems to the 
concerns of the members of civil society (Alexander 2006; Jacobs 2000). For the cause of 
women’s rights to lead to civil repair, then, the media must bring the issue to the public’s 
attention. Regardless of the issue being portrayed in positive or negative light, it seems 
that treating women’s equality as a legitimate topic was enough for the issue to be taken 
seriously. 
 One sign that the interruption at Seneca Falls was successful is the shifting 
political concerns that the organizers, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, engaged 
with in their lives. In collections of both of their letters and speeches, abolitionism was 
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their main political concern.18 Examined in detail in chapter four, the two found the 
abolition movement to be one of the main venues for women to be involved in politics in 
the civil sphere. After the convention, however, their focused shifted to women’s 
equality. Throughout the 1850s, more of their letters and public lectures centered on 
women’s rights and equality. In a letter to Mary Ann White Johnson and the Ohio 
Women’s Convention in 1850, Elizabeth Cady Stanton wrote: “Man cannot represent 
us… Man cannot legislate for us” (Stanton 1997b: 164, 165). In 1849, Lucretia Mott said 
the following in a speech delivered in Philadelphia:  
…[S]he asks nothing as a favor, but as a right, she wants to be acknowledged a 
moral, responsible being… She is seeking not to be governed by laws, in the 
making of which she has no voice… She is deprived of almost every right in civil 
society, and is a cypher [sic] in the nation… (Mott 1980b: 154). 
 
The demand for equality is made again by showing women’s subordinate position in civil 
and non-civil spheres in life. Through basing their claims in religious beliefs and 
republican notions of citizenship, Stanton and Mott continued making their demands for 
equality. 
 The rise of women’s rights conventions after Seneca Falls is evidence that the 
question of equality was moving from rare, singular moments of politics to more regular, 
and multiple moments of politics. Three weeks after Seneca Falls a second convention 
was held in Rochester, NY. Organized by some Quaker women from Rochester that 
attended the convention in Seneca Falls, these women wished to immediately continue 
the project of women’s equality (McMillen 2008: 95). In 1850 conventions were held in 
Salem, OH and Worcester, MA, with the convention in Worcester the first National 
                                                
18 Letters and speeches of the two have been collected in The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton 
and Susan B. Anthony (1997), Lucretia Mott: Her Complete Speeches and Sermons (1980), and Selected 
Letters of Lucretia Coffin Mott (2002). 
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Woman’s Right Convention (McMillen 2008: 106). This national convention was held, 
with the exception of 1857, every year between 1850 and the start of the Civil War in 
1861 (McMillen 2008: 110). In January and February of 1855 in New York, 25 
conventions were held on women’s rights (Anthony 1997a: 291; Anthony 1997b: 301). 
The continuation of conventions for the decade following Seneca Falls was the 
continuation of politics, or furthering the project of equality from interruption to actual 
change.  
 It must be noted, however, that the success and growth of the movement was also 
based partially on women taking advantage of their racial, ethnic, class, and religious 
privilege at the time. Equality for women did not necessarily mean equality for all. 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton showed this reliance on privilege in a letter on gaining suffrage: 
“We need not prove ourselves equal to Daniel Webster to enjoy this privilege for the 
most ignorant Irishman in the ditch has all the civil rights he has…” (Stanton 1997a: 
104). Drawing on anti-Irish sentiment, Stanton’s argument boils down to the claim that 
women deserve equality if a “lower” group of people already has that right. After the 
Civil War and the passing of the 15th Amendment, claims for equality based in racism 
emerged again, where women’s suffrage was at times treated as a reactionary response to 
African American men gaining the vote (McMillen 2008: 162). In these two cases, 
women could draw on their own privileged position compared to others as a method to 
gain political and civil equality.  
 There are two important things to note in how women at times used their own 
privilege to further their equality at the expense of others. First, this language for equality 
based on some form of superiority is part of a discursive repertoire in the US that has 
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tended to place Protestant, white, and bourgeois Americans at the head of a complex 
system of inequality (Collins 2000). In other words, drawing on these supposedly morally 
“inferior” groups as reasoning for equality provides a “…conceptual mapping of 
possibilities for action” based in the idea that white Protestant women are morally 
superior to other groups that (nominally) have civil equality (Steinberg 1999: 750). 
Second, it must be noted that even though at times women drew on their positions of 
privilege to further their project of equality, this does not negate the realness of their 
demand for equality. As the deconstruction of the “Declaration of Sentiments” showed, 
the women at Seneca Falls had real demands for equality based in their own conditions of 
exclusion. Their privilege and occasionally derogatory methods, while they must be 
noted, do not affect their condition as unequal in numerous spheres of life. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 The works of Jacques Rancière provides a compelling framework from which to 
understand equality in the civil and non-civil spheres, and how these spheres relate to 
each other. It also allows cultural sociology to deal with equality as a symbolic boundary 
without resorting to determinist theories of society that reduce aspects of culture to 
overarching material structures. Though some sociological reconstruction of Rancière’s 
work was made, the result is a culturally autonomous, sociological theory of equality. 
 This chapter argues for the use of Rancière’s work in sociology as the Politics of 
Equals, showing how this conception of politics can help us understand how an excluded 
subjectivity can begin the process of entering the civil sphere and non-civil sphere as 
equals. For the women at Seneca Falls, this meant arguing that women had the same 
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natural rights as men and that their exclusion was counter to sacred codes of each 
relevant sphere: civil society, religion, etc. Here we saw that equality took on various 
forms, from an absolute equality in the civil sphere to equally stratified in the economic 
sphere. Looking at this political interruption through a Neo-Durkheimian perspective 
shows the how of the emergence and development of politics can happen, bridging 
Rancière’s abstract philosophy to cultural sociology. Their similar treatment of semi-
autonomous spheres with their own hierarchies and the symbolic base of politics and the 
question of inclusion/exclusion make the two approaches complimentary. In addition, 
Neo-Durkheimian studies of politics provide a strong example of showing how a moment 
of politics can arise, and how it can lead to some form of enacted or institutional change.  
 But Rancière’s theories do not fit entirely in the Neo-Durkheimian school. The 
focus on equality both limits and radicalizes cultural theories of democracy. It limits in 
that this focus turns us away from solidarity and the larger interplay and balance of 
cultural codes like liberty and equality that are part of the Neo-Durkheimian theory of 
democracy and civil society, and radicalizes in that Rancière provides a way to create a 
cultural theory of equality as praxis. Where Alexander treats equality alongside other 
cultural codes in the civil sphere as a means towards greater solidarity, Rancière sees 
equality as the goal in itself society should be striving towards. This is counter to 
Alexander (2006), who after lamenting the “death of the socialist dream,” (549) or a 
utopian equality, claims “Civil solidarity – that is the real utopia” (550). Because of his 
insistence that equality is an always-unfinished project (Rancière 1995: 83-4), one must 
look critically at any natural order, or in Durkheimian terms, systems of solidarity, as 
these mask myriad forms of domination and exclusion. Rancière challenges us to 
 104 
critically examine relationships, roles, and subjectivities in a social order to further the 
project of equality. These “hidden” inequalities are found in all spheres of life – civil and 
non-civil – making the difference between the spheres less important for Rancière. This 
dialogue between two goals that at times can be opposing can open up questions over the 
current and ideal states of various spheres, the nature of both equality and solidarity, and 
the value of interruptions in spheres with strong naturalized inequalities. The key 
difference between the approaches is lies not in the process of politics in the civil sphere, 
but the result – striving more towards equality or solidarity. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: ON THE POLITICS OF EQUALS 
6.1 Introduction 
 The preceding chapters have constructed a new sociological theory of politics 
centered on the question of equality. Though the discipline is full of theories linking 
inequality to myriad social structures, the Politics of Equals is a universal theory of 
equality. The role of the Politics of Equals is not to explain social inequalities as a means 
to show what must be done to further equality. Instead, it is a theory of equality itself, 
illustrating the emergence, contradictions, and endings of political moments and 
movements. Studies of inequality present a danger. As Rancière (1991, 1995) argued and 
Pelletier (2009a) expanded on, examining unequal subjectivities may cement these or 
other inequalities because these works oftentimes confirm hierarchy and inequality. The 
voice of the researcher takes precedence in confirming this inequality. Rather than 
explicitly study inequality, the social scientist should study equality, or the subjectivities 
or groups engaged in politics. Studying the demand, or “verification” of equality 
(Pelletier 2009b) allows those making the demand to be heard in their own voice; they 
articulate the inequalities they experience, and they articulate the material and symbolic 
changes they want seen in society. Where traditional studies of inequality indirectly are 
concerned with equality, studies on the verification of equality indirectly address 
inequalities present in society. 
 This shift in focus from inequality towards equality makes the Politics of Equals a 
universal theory of equality. Rather than limit a theory to structures and identities such as 
class, race, gender, or the intersections between some collection of structures and 
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identities, the Politics of Equals is applicable across structures and identities. The focus 
on equality and its verification allows for a more universal approach, as the particular 
structures surrounding domination (capitalism, racism, patriarchy, etc.) are downplayed 
in favor of examining how subjectivities claim the equality they have with all others. The 
Politics of Equals is a theoretical lens from which a researcher can further understandings 
of how particular cases of politics relate to the question of equality.  
 
6.2 The Politics of Equals 
 The sociological theory that has been constructed here is based in four themes or 
guiding points. Expanded on throughout the previous chapters, these themes provide the 
key elements from which the Politics of Equals can be used for further empirical 
research. The nature of politics, the democratic paradox, the boundlessness of politics, 
and a non-romantic approach to democracy and equality all makeup key components of 
the Politics of Equals. 
 
6.2.1 Politics as the Demand for Equality 
 The most central of themes in the Politics of Equals is to separate politics into two 
forms: the politics of equals and governmental politics. This difference, based on 
Rancière’s distinction between politics and police, shows the stakes of political actions. 
As discussed in chapters one and two, the difference between politics and police is the 
symbolic nature of the political claims being made. Where politics (and the Politics of 
Equals) seeks a reconstruction of existing relationships between subjectivities, police 
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(and governmental politics) does not. Claims here are centered on other material or 
symbolic gains and losses. The Politics of Equals is based on a fundamental disagreement 
between the included and excluded of a particular sphere. At stake in this disagreement is 
the conceptualization of that excluded subjectivity. How can that excluded subjectivity 
both show their current state of inequality and demand real inclusion in a way that the 
“included” understand them? Rancière is adamant that disagreement and conflict is 
essential for any equality to be realized (Rancière 1999). Disagreement is necessary 
because it disrupts stable conceptualization of the roles and parts of a society. It 
challenges a social order to rethink “who exists” and “in what role should they exist.” No 
matter the form of a moment of politics to a movement and institutionalization of that 
politics, this fundamental disagreement must be present for it to be part of the Politics of 
Equals. 
   
6.2.2 The Democratic Paradox 
 Rancièrean political theory posits that all democratic forms of life face a paradox: 
emancipatory moments, or politics itself, are ineluctably tied to oppressive outcomes 
(Rancière 1999). Where one claim for equality can become recognized and 
institutionalized, some other subjectivity is denied or ignored a part in the emancipatory 
moment. Even the most horizontal or democratically-organized model of collective 
political action inevitably produces exclusions, either internally or externally. Some 
subjectivities and discourses will be unheard, silenced, or excluded. Put simply, there is a 
difference between Rancière’s politics as an enactment of equality, and the 
institutionalization of equality, be it through formal or informal means. This 
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understanding posits that even the most seemingly radical political moments become 
focused on narrower groups of subjectivities as politics goes from the demand and 
enactment of equality to some (formal or informal) institutionalization of that equality. 
 Numerous democratic and social movement theorists have approached the issue 
of addressing the issue of inequality in democracy and democratic social movements. 
Stressing the importance of agonism (Mouffe 1993; 2005), participation (Laclau 2005; 
Baiocchi 2005), deliberation (Benhabib 1996), horizontalism (Sitrin 2006), or some other 
form (Melucci 1996; Matynia 2009), these works generally look to solve, or at least 
mitigate, inequalities that underlie democracy and the movements that struggle for social 
justice and equality. Instead of theorizing new models or organizational forms of 
movements that can supposedly address the issue, sociology should uncover both why 
and how democratic politics, and social movements in particular, recreate some 
inequalities in their attempts to address other unequal relations. This places sociology in 
direct dialogue with political theory, examining the empirical contours of theoretical 
claims in order to understand how this theory might exist in the social world. 
 The Politics of Equals brings to light not only the fundamental difference between 
politics and police for sociology, it also makes aware the limiting and narrowing of 
politics as it moves from moment and movement to institutionalization. Chapter Five 
illustrates the beginnings of a political moment and movement. The Seneca Falls 
convention and Declaration of Rights and Sentiments made numerous demands for 
equality in multiple spheres, from civil to economic, religious, and domestic. However, 
the Women’s Rights Movement that emerged after the Civil War was largely focused on 
a singular issue – suffrage. Other demands for equality receded while coalescence 
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emerged around suffrage. The open and radical demands at Seneca Falls found a more 
narrow from that could be institutionalized, thereby granting some form of equality in the 
civil sphere. At the same time, the first wave of the women’s rights movement was 
focused on the issues of white, middle class women at the expanse of women of color and 
women of lower classes, among other exclusions. While the excluding of Seneca Falls 
was supposedly open to all women, it was in fact excluding many women from achieving 
meaningful equality. 
   
6.2.3 The Boundlessness of Politics 
 Following the themes addressed above, it follows that the Politics of Equals must 
keep an open approach in order to view how and where demands for equality emerge, 
shift, succeed, or fail. To do this means not putting on blinders that delimit the locations 
or causal forces that can lead to moments of politics. Political sociology – despite insights 
from feminist theory and critical race theory, among others – still too often roots politics 
in particular settings or causal mechanisms. The result is a depoliticizing political 
sociology, one that turns an eye towards instances of politics that emerge in private 
settings or between two people or not caused by some material or symbolic structure. 
Chapter three uncovered this problematic political sociology faces, calling for a version 
of political sociology that that separates the political from the social. This separation is 
needed because, from a Rancièrean perspective, political moments are ephemeral and 
unpredictable. Assuming these moments happen because of some structuring force, or in 
some location annihilates the possibility of politics happening in certain situations or 
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settings. Uncoupling the political from the social allows the researcher to study equality 
in the terms set by those demanding it. 
 
6.2.4 Non-Progressive Politics 
 Finally, a more implicit theme found throughout the Politics of Equals is the non-
romantic approach to understanding democracy, politics, and social movements. 
Exclusion and inequality makes up a central portion of any democratically-oriented 
politics, as evidenced not only by discussion here of the community of equals, but also 
the democratic paradox. At the same time, recognizing that a political moment may be 
one meant to exclude certain subjectivities adds a dimension to Rancière’s politics that 
recognizes that a verification of equality can be as common as a verification of an Other’s 
inequality. 
 This critical approach to understanding democracy leads the Politics of Equals to 
challenge assumptions that progressive social movements or processes of civil repair 
strengthen democratic society or civil solidarity. In fact, as argued in Chapter Four, 
sociological arguments for solidarity as a guiding utopian goal must be treated cautiously 
since solidarity is merely another form of Rancière’s natural order. This state either 
masks the ever-present inequalities in democratic society or legitimizes those inequalities 
as normal. It is only through disagreement – politics itself that this “better” solidarity 
sphere is recognized as being unjust. The process then repeats itself, ad infinitum. 
Equality must be a continual point of departure – not an endpoint – so that the risks of 
depoliticizing the excluded can be minimized. 
 111 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Adams, Julia. 1999. “Culture in rational-Choice Theories of State Formation.” In 
State/Culture: State-Formation After the Cultural Turn. Ed. George Steinmetz. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pp. 98-122. 
 
Adams, Laura L. 2010. The Spectacular State: Culture and National Identity in 
Uzbekistan. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Agamben 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
 
Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2001. ‘The Long and Winding Road: Civil Repair of Intimate 
Injustice.’ Sociological Theory 19(3): 371-400. 
 
Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2003. “The Strong Program in Cultural Sociology: Elements of a 
Structural Hermeneutics (with Philip Smith).” In The Meanings of Social Life: A 
Cultural Sociology. Ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Pp. 11-26. 
 
Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2004. “Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance Between Ritual 
and Strategy.” Sociological Theory. 22(4): 527-73. 
 
Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2006. The Civil Sphere. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Philip Smith. 1993. “The Discourse of American Civil Society: 
A New Proposal for Cultural Studies.” Theory and Society. 22: 151-207. 
 
Althusser, Louis. 2008 [1971].  “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes 
towards an Investigation).” In On Ideology. London: Verso. Pp. 1-60. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism. Second Edition. London: Verso. 
 
Anthony, Susan B. 1997a. “Woman’s Right – Suffrage.” 5 January, 1855. In The Selected 
Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony. Vol. I. Ed. Ann D. 
Gordon. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Pp. 291. 
 
Anthony, Susan B. 1997b. “Woman’s Rights Meetings.” 7 February, 1855. In The 
Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony. Vol. I. Ed. Ann 
D. Gordon. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Pp. 301-02. 
 
Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
 112 
Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. Second Edition. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Arendt, Hannah. 1968. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New Edition. Orlando, FL: 
Harcourt. 
 
Austin, J.L. 1975. How to do Things with Words. Second Edition. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Auyero, Javier. 2001. Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy 
of Evita. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Badiou, Alain. 2005. Metapolitics. London: Verso. 
 
Baiocchi, Gianpaolo. 2005. Militants and Civilians: The Politics of Participatory 
Democracy in Porto Alegre. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Baiocchi, Gianpaolo and Brian T. Connor. 2008. “The Ethnos in the Polis: Political 
Ethnography as a Mode of Inquiry.” Sociology Compass. 2(1): 139-55. 
 
Baiocchi, Gianpaolo and Brian T. Connor. 2013. “Politics as Interruption: Rancière’s 
Community of Equals and Governmentality.” Thesis Eleven. 117(1): 89-100. 
 
Bartlett, Elizabeth Ann. 1988. “Introduction.” In Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and 
Other Essays. Ed. Elizabeth Ann Bartlett. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Pp. 1-30. 
 
Bellah, Robert N. Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. 
Tipton. 1985. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American 
Life. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Benhabib, Seyla. 1996. “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy.” In 
Seyla Benhabib, ed. Democracy and Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. Pp. 67-94. 
 
Berezin, Mabel. 1997. Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Interwar Italy. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Berezin, Mabel. 2009. Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times: Culture, Security and 
Populism in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bilici Mucahit. 2012. Finding Mecca in America: How Islam is Becoming an American 
Religion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Bingham, Charles and Gert Biesta. 2010. Jacques Rancière: Education, Truth, 
Emancipation. London. Continuum International Publishing Group. 
 113 
 
Blackstone, William. 1979 [1841]. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Bloch, Ruth H. 2003. Gender and Morality in Anglo-American Culture 1650-1800. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Boltanski, Luc and Eve Chiapello. 2005. The New Spirit of Capitalism. London: Verso. 
 
Boltanski, Luc and Laurent Thévenot. 2006. On Justification: Economies of Worth. 
Translated by Catherine Porter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Bottomore, Tom. 1979. Political Sociology. New York: Harper. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1996. The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1999. “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic 
Field.” In State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn. Ed. George 
Steinmetz. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pp. 51-75. 
 
Brault, Pascale-Anne and Michael Naas. 2010. “Translator’s Note.” In. The Truth of 
Democracy. New York: Fordham University Press. Pp. ix-xii. 
 
Brown, Wendy. 2006. Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire.  
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. “In the Name of the Nation: Reflections on Nationalism and 
Patriotism.” Citizenship Studies. 8(2): 115-127. 
 
Bryson, Bethany. 1996. “Anything but Metal’: Symbolic Exclusion and Musical 
Dislikes.” American Sociological Review. 61(5): 884-899. 
 
Burawoy, Michael. 1979. Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process Under 
Monopoly Capitalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Burawoy, Michael. 1985. The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes Under Capitalism 
and Socialism. London: Verso. 
 
 114 
Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Butler, Judith. 1997. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Calhoun, Craig (ed). 1992. Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press. 
 
Calhoun, Craig. 1997. Nationalism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
de Certeau, Michel. 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
 
Chambers, Samuel A. 2009.  “A Queer Politics of the Democratic Miscount.” 
Borderlands. 8(2): 1-23. 
 
Chambers, Samuel A. 2011. “Jacques Rancière and the Problem of Pure Politics.” 
European Journal of Political Theory. 10(3): 303-326. 
 
Chatterjee, Partha. 2004. The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in 
most of the World. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Clawson, Dan. 2003. The Next Upsurge: Labor and the New Social Movements. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Collins, Patricia Hill. 2000. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the 
Politics of Empowerment. Second Edition. New York: Routledge. 
 
Conley, Tom. 2009. “Cinema and its Discontents.” In Jacques Rancière: History, 
Politics, Aesthetics. Ed. Gabriel Rockhill and Philip Watts. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. Pp. 216-228. 
 
Connolly, William E. 2008. Capitalism and Christianity, American Style. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press. 
 
Connor, Brian T. and Gianpaolo Baiocchi. 2011. “Democracy as Paradox: the Political 
Sociology of Jacques Rancière.” Presented Paper at the ASA Annual Meetings, 
Las Vegas, NV. 
 
Cruikshank, Barbara. 1999. The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other 
Subjects. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Dahl, Robert A. 1961. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 
 115 
Dean, Jodi. 2009. “Politics without Politics.” Parallax. 15(3): 20-36. 
 
“Declaration of Rights and Sentiments.” 20 July, 1848. In Seneca Falls and the Origins 
of the Women’s Rights Movement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 237-41. 
 
Den Heyer, Kent. 2009. “What if Curriculum (of a Certain Kind) Doesn’t Matter?” 
Curriculum Inquiry. 39(1): 27-40. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. 1988. Limited Inc. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. 1994. Specters of Marx. New York: Routledge. 
 
Domhoff, G. William. 1996. State Autonomy or Class Dominance? Case Studies on 
Policy Making in America. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
 
Durkheim, Emile. 1984 [1893]. The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free Press. 
 
Eliasoph, Nina. 1998. Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday 
Life. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Emirbayer, Mustafa and Chad Alan Goldberg. 2005. “Pragmatism, Bourdieu, and 
Collective Emotions in Contentious Politics.” Theory and Society. 34: 469-518. 
 
Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds). 1985. Bringing the 
State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Eyerman, Ron. 2006. “Performing Opposition, or how Social Movements Move.” In 
Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual. Ed. 
Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen and Jason L. Mast. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. Pp. 193-217. 
 
Fantasia, Rick. 1989. Cultures of Solidarity: Consciousness, Action, and Contemporary 
American Workers. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Fantasia, Rick and Eric L. Hirsch. 1995. “Culture in Rebellion: The Appropriation and 
Transformation of the Veil in the Algerian Revolution.” In Social Movements and 
Culture. Ed. Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans. Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press. Pp. 144-159. 
 
Ferguson, James, and Akhil Gupta. 2002. “Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography 
of Neoliberal Governmentality.” American Ethnologist 29(4): 981-1002. 
 
Ferris, David. 2009. “Politics after Aesthetics: Disagreeing with Rancière.” Parallax. 
15(3): 37-49. 
 
 116 
Fligstein, Neil and Doug McAdam. 2012. A Theory of Fields. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 2007. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de 
France 1977-1978. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 2008. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 
1978-1979. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Fuller, S. Margaret. 1980 [1845]. Woman in the Nineteenth Century. Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press. 
 
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Giesen, Berhard. 2006. “Performing the Sacred: a Durkheimian Perspective on the 
Performative Turn in the Social Sciences.” In Social Performance: Symbolic 
Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual. Ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard 
Giesen and Jason L. Mast. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 325-67. 
 
Glaeser, Andreas. 2000. Divided in Unity: Identity, Germany, and the Berlin Police.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Goldberg, Chad Alan. 2001. “Social Citizenship and a Reconstructed Tocqueville.” 
American Sociological Review. 66: 289-315. 
 
Gordon, Ann D. (ed). 1997. The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. 
Anthony. Vol I. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
 
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Ed. 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers. 
 
Greene, Dana (ed). 1980. Lucretia Mott: Her Complete Speeches and Sermons. New 
York: The Edwin Mellen Press. 
 
Grimké, Sarah. 1988a. “The Original Equality of Woman, November, 1837.” In Letters 
on the Equality of the Sexes and Other Essays. Edited by Elizabeth Ann Bartlett. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. Pp. 31-34. 
 
Grimké, Sarah. 1988b. “The Pastoral Letter of the General Association of Congregational 
Ministers of Massachusetts, July, 1837.” In Letters on the Equality of the Sexes 
and Other Essays. Edited by Elizabeth Ann Bartlett. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. Pp. 37-41. 
 
Gupta, Akhil. 1995. “Blurred Boundaries: the Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of 
Politics, and the Imagined State.” American Ethnologist. 22(2): 375-402. 
 
 117 
Gupta, Akhil. 2012. Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Gurko, Miriam. 1976. The Ladies of Seneca Falls: the Birth of the Woman’s Rights 
Movement. New York: Shocken Books. 
 
Hall, Stuart, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John N. Clarke, and Brian Roberts. 1978. 
Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order. London: Macmillan. 
 
Hallward, Peter. 2006. “Staging Equality: On Rancière’s Theatrocracy.” New Left 
Review. 37: 109-129. 
 
Hansen, Thomas B. 1999. The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in 
Modern India. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Hebdige, Dick. 1979. Subculture: the Meaning of Style. London: Routledge. 
 
Hennion, Antoine. 2001. “Music Lovers: Taste as Performance.” Theory, Culture and 
Society. 18(5): 1-22. 
 
Hewitt, Nancy A. 1986. “Feminist Friends: Agrarian Quakers and the Emergence of 
Woman’s Rights in America.” Feminist Studies. 12(1): 27-49. 
 
Hewlett, Nick. 2007. Badiou, Balibar, Rancière: Re-thinking Emancipation. London: 
Continuum International Publishing Group. 
 
Hicks, Alexander and Joya Misra. 1993. “Political Resources and the growth of Welfare 
in Affluent Capitalist Democracies, 1960-1982.” American Journal of Sociology. 
99: 668-710. 
 
Isenberg, Nancy. 1998. Sex and Citizenship in Antebellum America. Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Jacobs, Ronald N. 2000. Race, Media, and the Crisis of Civil Society. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Jessop, Bob. 1999. “Narrating the Future of the National Economy and the National 
State: Remarks on Remapping Regulation and Reinventing Governance.” In 
State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn. Ed. George Steinmetz. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pp. 378-405. 
 
Johnston, Josée and Shyon Baumann. 2007. “Democracy versus Distinction: A Study of 
Omnivorousness in Gourmet Food Writing.” American Journal of Sociology. 
113(1): 165-204. 
 
 118 
Kerber, Linda K. 1980. Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary 
America. New York: Norton. 
 
Klinghoffer, Judith Apter and Lois Elkis. 1992. “‘The Petticoat Electors’: Women’s 
Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1807.” Journal of the Early Republic. 12: 159-193. 
 
Krause, Monika. 2008. “Undocumented Migrants: An Arendtian Perspective.” European 
Journal of Political Theory. 7(3): 331-348. 
 
Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. On Populist Reason. London: Verso. 
 
Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. 2001. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics. Second Edition. London: Verso. 
 
Lamont, Michèle. 2000. The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of 
Race, Class, and Immigration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Lamont, Michèle and Marcel Fournier. 1992. Cultivating Differences: Symbolic 
Boundaries and the Making of Inequality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Lamont, Michèle and Virág Molnár. 2002. “The Study of Boundaries in the Social 
Sciences.” Annual Review of Sociology. 28: 167-95. 
 
Lamont, Michèle, and Laurent Thévenot. 2000. “Introduction: Toward a Renewed 
Comparative Cultural Sociology.” In Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociology: 
Repertoires of Evaluation in France and the United States. Edited by Michèle 
Lamont and Laurent Thévenot.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 1-
24. 
 
Latour, Bruno. 1987. Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through 
Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Liang, Lawrence. 2009. “Interview with Jacques Rancière.” 
http://kafila.org/2009/02/12/interview-with-jacques-ranciere/. Last access: 9 May, 
2011. 
 
Lichterman, Paul. 1996. The Search for Political Community: American Activists 
Reinventing Commitment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lichterman, Paul. 2005. Elusive Togetherness: Church Groups Trying to Bridge 
America's Divisions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Mahler, Matthew. 2006. “Politics as Vocation: Towards a Sensualist Understanding of 
Political Engagement.” Qualitative Sociology. 29(3): 281-300. 
 
 119 
Mahmood, Saba. 2005. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Marilley, Suzanne M. 1996. Woman Suffrage and the Origins of Liberal Feminism in the 
United States, 1820-1920. 
 
Martin, John Levi. 2003. “What is Field Theory?” American Journal of Sociology. 
109(1): 1-49. 
 
Matynia, Elzbieta. 2009. Performative Democracy. Boulder, CO: Paradigm. 
 
May, Todd. 2008. The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality.  
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
 
May, Todd. 2009. “There are no Queers: Jacques Rancière and Post-Identity Politics.” 
Borderlands. 8(2): 1-17. 
 
May, Todd. 2010. Contemporary Political Movements and the Thought of Jacques 
Rancière: Equality in Action. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
 
McAdam, Doug. 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 
1930-1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
McAdam, Doug and Yang Su. 2002. “The War at Home: Antiwar Protests and 
Congressional Voting, 1965 to 1973.” American Sociological Review. 67: 696-
721. 
 
McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
McMillen, Sally G. 2008. Seneca Falls and the Origins of the Women’s Rights 
Movement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Melucci, Alberto. 1992. “Liberation or Meaning? Social Movements, Culture and 
Democracy.” Development and Change.  23(3): 43-77. 
 
Melucci, Alberto. 1996. Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Miller, Peter and Nikolas Rose. 1995. “Production, Identity, and Democracy.” Theory 
and Society. 24: 427-67. 
 
Miller, Peter and Nikolas Rose. 2008. Governing the Present: Administering Economic, 
Social, and Political Life.  Cambridge, UK: Polity. 
 
Mills, C. Wright. 1956. The Power Elite. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 120 
 
Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 2003. Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, 
Practicing Solidarity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Mott, Lucretia Coffin. 1980a. “The Truth of God… The Righteousness of God.” Sermon 
Delivered at Marlboro Chapel, Boston, 23 September 1841. In Lucretia Coffin 
Mott: Her Complete Speeches and Sermons. Ed. Dana Greene. New York: The 
Edwin Mellen Press. Pp. 25-51. 
 
Mott, Lucretia Coffin. 1980b. “Discourse on Woman.” Delivered 17 December, 1849. In 
Lucretia Mott: Her Compete Speeches and Sermons. Ed. Dana Greene. New 
York: The Edwin Mellen Press. Pp. 143-162. 
 
Mott, Lucretia Coffin. 2002. “To Elizabeth Cady Stanton.” 16 July, 1848. In Selected 
Letters of Lucretia Coffin Mott.  Ed. Beverly Wilson Palmer. Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press. P. 163. 
 
Mouffe, Chantal. 1993. The Return of the Political. London: Verso. 
 
Mouffe, Chantal. 2005. On the Political. London: Routledge. 
 
Nancy, Jean-Luc. 2010. The Truth of Democracy. New York: Fordham University Press. 
 
Nash, Kate. 2000. Contemporary Political Sociology: Globalization, Politics, and Power. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 
 
Nash, Kate. 2002. “Thinking Political Sociology: Beyond the Limits of Post-Marxism.” 
History of the Human Sciences. 15(4): 97-114. 
 
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. 2002. Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Norton, Mary Beth. 1980. Liberty’s Daughters: The revolutionary Experience of 
American Women, 1750-1800. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 
 
Norton, Mary Beth. 2011. Separated by their Sex: Women in Public and Private in the 
Colonial Atlantic. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Offe, Claus. 1984. The Contradictions of the Welfare State. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. 1994. Racial Formation in the United States: From 
the 1960s to the 1990s. Second Edition. New York: Routledge. 
 
Ong, Aihwa. 2003. Buddha is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America.  
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
 121 
Ong, Aihwa. 2006. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and 
Sovereignty.  Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
Orloff, Ann Shola. 1999. “Motherhood, Work, and Welfare in the United States, Britain, 
Canada, and Australia.” In State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural 
Turn. Ed. George Steinmetz. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pp. 321-354. 
 
Orloff, Ann Shola. 2012. “Remaking Power and Politics.” Social Science History. 36(1): 
1-21. 
 
Paley, Julia. 2001. Marketing Democracy: Power and Social Movements in Post-
Dictatorship Chile. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Palmer, Beverly Wilson (ed). 2002. Selected Letters of Lucretia Coffin Mott. Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press. 
 
Parker, Andrew. 2009. “Impossible Speech Acts: Jacques Rancière’s Erich Auerbach.” In 
Jacques Rancière: History, Politics, Aesthetics. Ed. Gabriel Rockhill and Philip 
Watts. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Pp. 249-257. 
 
Pelletier, Caroline. 2009a. “Emancipation, Equality, and Education: Rancière’s critique 
of Bourdieu and the Question of Performativity.” Discourse: Studies in the 
Cultural Politics of Education. 30(2): 137-150. 
 
Pelletier, Caroline. 2009b. “Rancière and the poetics of the social sciences.” International 
Journal of Research and Method in Education. 32(3): 267-284. 
 
Peterson, Richard A. and Roger M. Kern. 1996. “Changing Highbrow Taste: From Snob 
to Omnivore.” American Sociological Review. 61(5): 900-907. 
 
Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Society. 2002. “To the Anti-Slavery Societies and Friends of 
the Oppressed Generally.” 10 November, 1836. In Selected Letters of Lucretia 
Coffin Mott. Ed. Beverly Wilson Palmer. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Pp. 36-7. 
 
Polletta, Francesca. 2006. It was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Pun, Ngai. 2005. Made In China: Women Factory Workers in a Global Workplace. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community. New York: Touchstone. 
 
Rancière, Jacques. 1984. “L’éthique de la sociologie.” In L’empire du sociologue, 
Collectif Revoltes logiques. Paris: Éditions La Découverte. Pp. 13-36. 
 122 
 
Rancière, Jacques. 1991. The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual 
Emancipation. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Rancière, Jacques. 1995. On the Shores of Politics. London: Verso. 
 
Rancière, Jacques. 1999. Disagreement. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
 
Rancière, Jacques. 2001. “Ten Theses on Politics.” Theory and Event. 5(3). 
 
Rancière, Jacques. 2004. The Philosopher and His Poor. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press. 
 
Rancière, Jacques. 2006. Hatred of Democracy. London: Verso. 
 
Rancière, Jacques. 2010a. “ Does Democracy Mean Something?” In Dissensus: On 
Politics and Aesthetics. Ed. Steven Corcoran. London: Continuum. Pp. 45-61. 
 
Rancière, Jacques. 2010b. “Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?” In Dissensus: On 
Politics and Aesthetics. Ed. Steven Corcoran. London: Continuum. Pp. 62-75. 
 
Rancière, Jacques. 2010c. “Biopolitics or Politics?” In Dissensus: On Politics and 
Aesthetics. Ed. Steven Corcoran. London: Continuum. Pp. 91-6. 
 
Rancière, Jacques. 2012 [1989]. Proletarian Nights: the Workers’ Dream in Nineteenth-
Century France. London: Verso. 
 
Reed, Isaac. 2006. “Social Dramas, Shipwrecks, and Cockfights: Conflict and Complicity 
in Social Performance.” In Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural 
Pragmatics, and Ritual. Ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen and Jason L. 
Mast. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 146-68. 
 
Rockhill, Gabriel. 2004. “The Silent Revolution.” SubStance. 33(1): 54-76. 
 
Rose, Nikolas, and Peter Miller. 1992. “Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of 
Government.” British Journal of Sociology. 43(2): 173-205. 
 
Ross, Kristin. 1991. “Translator’s Introduction.” In The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five 
Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation. Trans. Kristin Ross. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
 
Ryan, Mary. 1992. “Gender and Public Access: Women’s Politics in Nineteenth-Century 
America.” In Habermas and the Public Sphere. Edited by Craig Calhoun. 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 259-88. 
 
 123 
Schaap, Andrew. 2011. “Enacting the Right to have Rights: Jacques Rancière’s critique 
of Hannah Arendt.” European Journal of Political Theory. 10(1): 22-45. 
 
Schudson, Michael. 1989. “How Culture Works: Perspectives from Media Studies on the 
Efficacy of Symbols.” Theory and Society. 18:153-180. 
 
Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 
Sewell, William H. 1999. “The Concept(s) of Culture.” In Beyond the Cultural Turn: 
New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture. Eds. Victoria E. Bonnell and 
Lynn Hunt. Berkeley: University of California Press. 35-61. 
 
Simmel, Georg. 1955a. “Conflict.” In Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations.” New 
York: The Free Press. Pp. 11-123. 
 
Simmel, Geog. 1955b. “The Web of Group-Affiliations.” In Conflict and the Web of 
Group-Affiliations.” New York: The Free Press. Pp. 125-195. 
 
Sitrin, Marina. 2006. Horizontalism: Voices of Popular Power in Argentina. Oakland, 
CA: AK Press. 
 
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Smith, Anthony. 1983. Theories of Nationalism. London: Duckworth. 
 
Smith, Philip. 2006. Why War? The Cultural Logic of Iraq, the Gulf War, and Suez. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Snow, David A. and Robert D. Benford. 1992. “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest.” In 
Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. Ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg 
Mueller. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pp. 133-55. 
 
Somers, Margaret R. 2008. Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the 
Right to Have Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Stanton, Elizabeth Cady. 1993 [1898]. Eighty Years and More: Reminiscences 1815-
1897. Boston: Northeastern University Press. 
 
Stanton, Elizabeth Cady. 1997a. “Address by Elizabeth Cady Stanton on Woman’s 
Rights.” September, 1848. In The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and 
Susan B. Anthony. Vol. I. Ed. Ann D. Gordon. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press. Pp. 94-123. 
 
 124 
Stanton, Elizabeth Cady. 1997b. “To Mary Ann White Johnson and the Ohio Women’s 
Convention.” 7 April, 1850. In The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton 
and Susan B. Anthony. Vol. I. Ed. Ann D. Gordon. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press. Pp. 164-69. 
 
Stanton, Elizabeth Cady, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage. 1889. History of 
Woman Suffrage. Second Edition. Rochester, NY: Charles Mann. 
 
Steinmetz, George. 1993. Regulating the Social: The Welfare State and Local Politics in 
Imperial Germany. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Steinmetz, George (ed). 1999. State/Culture: State-Formation After the Cultural Turn. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Steinmetz, George. 2007. The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German 
Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Steinberg, Marc W. 1999. “The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action: A Dialogic 
Analysis of Repertoires of Discourse Among Nineteenth-Century English Cotton 
Spinners.” American Journal of Sociology. 105(3): 736-80. 
 
Tambakaki, Paulina. 2009. “When Does Politics Happen?” parallax. 15(3): 102-113. 
 
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
 
Tilly, Charles. 2006. “Afterward: Political Ethnography as Art and Science.” Qualitative 
Sociology. 29: 409-412. 
 
Ulary, Georganna. 2011. “Rancière, Kristeva and the Rehabilitation of Political Life.” 
Thesis Eleven. 106(1): 23-38. 
 
Wacquant, Loïc. 2004. “Pointers on Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics.” 
Constellations. 11(1): 3-15. 
 
Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society. Ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Wedeen, Lisa. 1999. Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in 
Contemporary Syria. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Wedeen, Lisa. 2008. Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Wellman, Judith. 1991. “The Seneca Falls Women’s Rights Convention: A Study of 
Social Networks.” Journal of Women’s History. 3(1): 9-37. 
 125 
 
Wellman, Judith. 2004. The Road to Seneca Falls: Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the First 
Woman’s Rights Convention. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
 
Williams, Raymond. 1977. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Williams, Rhys H. 1999. “Visions of the Good Society and the Religious roots of 
American Political Culture.” Sociology of Religion. 60(1): 1-34. 
 
Willis, Paul. 1977. Learning to Labor. Farnborough, UK: Saxon House. 
 
Wood, Richard L. 2002. Faith in Action: Religion, Race, and Democratic Organizing in 
America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Zerilli, Linda M. G. 2005. Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Zizek, Slavoj. 1989. The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso. 
 
 
